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INVENTIVE APPLICATION: A HISTORY
Jeffrey A. Lefstin*
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s recent cases on patent-eligible subject matter
have struggled to draw the line between unpatentable fundamental
principles, such as laws of nature and abstract ideas, and patentable
inventions. In Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court suggested that only
“inventive applications” of fundamental principles fall within the
domain of the patent system. Both Mayo and its intellectual forebear,
Parker v. Flook, anchored this doctrine in Neilson v. Harford, the
famous “hot blast” case decided by the Court of Exchequer in 1841.
But the Supreme Court has founded the inventive application
doctrine on a basic misapprehension. Neilson’s patent on the hot blast
was sustained not because his application was inventive, but because it
was entirely conventional and obvious. In both England and the United
States, the hot-blast cases taught that inventors could patent any
practical application of a new discovery, regardless of the application’s
novelty or inventiveness. And for over one hundred years, American
authority consistently maintained that practical application
distinguished unpatentable discovery from patentable invention.
The inventive application test in fact originated in 1948, in Funk
Brothers v. Kalo Inoculant, which departed radically from the
established standard of patent eligibility. In the wake of Funk Brothers,
the lower courts struck down a series of patents unquestionably within
the technological arts—arguably the precise innovations the patent
system sought to promote. This history is largely forgotten today, but it
should serve as a cautionary tale of the patents that could be invalidated
if the Court maintains inventive application as the test for patent
eligibility.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the boundary between an unpatentable principle and a
patent-eligible invention? That question, now framed as the doctrine of
patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 1 was not born
from the patent system’s encounters with new technologies such as
software or biotechnology. Courts have struggled with the boundary
between principle and invention since the earliest days of the patent
system. Yet after four patent-eligibility opinions from the Supreme

1. Patent eligibility under § 101 is only a question of whether an invention is even the
proper subject matter for a patent—that is, whether such inventions are even within the bounds
of the patent system. A patent-eligible invention under § 101 is patentable only if it further
complies with the statutory requirements of patentability: utility under § 101, novelty under
§ 102, nonobviousness under § 103, and adequate disclosure and claiming under § 112. See 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that inventions in enumerated categories of subject matter may
receive patents “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title”).
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Court in the span of five years—Bilski v. Kappos,2 Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,3 Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 4 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International 5 —that boundary line has rarely been so difficult to
discern.
In Mayo, the Supreme Court appeared to set forth a universal
framework for resolving questions of patent-eligible subject matter.
Prior to Mayo, the Court had emphasized that a fundamental principle—
an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon—could not be
the subject matter of a patent. But the Court had not provided a clear
analytical framework to differentiate between a patent-ineligible
fundamental principle and a patent-eligible application of a fundamental
principle. In Mayo, the Court held that for a process focusing on the use
of a natural law or abstract idea to constitute a patent-eligible
application of that principle, the process must include an additional
“inventive concept” sufficient to ensure that the claimed process
amounted to something more than a monopoly on the abstract idea or
law of nature itself. 6 Finding that the remaining elements in the
challenged invention were nothing more than “well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists in the field,”
the Court held the claims at issue were not patent-eligible subject
matter.7
The patent challenged in Mayo was for a process supposedly
embodying a fundamental “law of nature.”8 Yet the Court proposed a
unified analysis that would apply as well to a patent attempting to claim
a natural phenomenon or an abstract idea. 9 The Court explained its
earlier decisions involving mathematical equations as cases where
patent eligibility hinged on whether the patentee had added something
more than “conventional” and “obvious” activity to the underlying
algorithm.10 While few might have defended the precise claims at issue
in Mayo, the potential sweep of Mayo’s test prompted particular
concern in the biotechnology industry. Some observers saw the decision
as a threat to the patentability of advances in personalized medicine,
2. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
4. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
5. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
6. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294–95, 1297.
7. Id. at 1298.
8. Id. at 1294.
9. Id. at 1300 (“[S]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of
generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those laws,
phenomena, and ideas patentable.”).
10. See id. at 1298–1300.
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identification of biomarkers, the use of existing drugs for new
indications, and other inventions where implementation is relatively
trivial once a discovery has been made.11
Some of those fears have come to pass. For example, in Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 12 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California invalidated a patent on a method of
diagnosing fetal abnormalities by the amplification of cell-free fetal
DNA in the maternal bloodstream. 13 While the patentees first
discovered the existence of cell-free fetal DNA in the maternal blood,
the means for implementing that discovery in a diagnostic method—
amplifying and sequencing the fetal DNA—was routine in the field at
the time of the invention.14 The claims therefore lacked an “inventive
concept” that would render them patent eligible under Mayo.15
In the wake of Mayo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit attempted to clarify the patent eligibility of computerimplemented inventions in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. 16
However, disagreement over Mayo’s import split the court, negating the
Federal Circuit’s attempt to provide a coherent test.17 The court agreed
on one thing: When the Supreme Court required an inventive concept, it
could not have meant that the patentee’s application of a fundamental
principle must itself be novel or nonobvious.18 Yet the court could not
agree on whether an inventive concept required a “genuine human
contribution” to the subject matter of the claim19 or whether an inventive
concept was “shorthand” for a requirement that the claim not be
coextensive with an underlying fundamental principle.20

11. See, e.g., Laura W. Smalley, Will Nanotechnology Products Be Impacted by the
Federal Courts’ “Product of Nature” Exception to Subject-Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C.
101?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 397, 437–39 (2014).
12. 19 F. Supp. 3d 938 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
13. See id. at 954.
14. See id. at 953 (“The evidence shows that [it] was well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity to combine these steps to detect DNA in serum or plasma.”).
15. See id. at 951 (“Thus, the only inventive concept contained in the patent is the
discovery of cffDNA, which is not patentable.”); id. at 953 (“Therefore, looking at the claimed
processes as a whole, the only inventive component of the processes in the ‘540 patent is to
apply those well-understood, routine processes to paternally inherited cffDNA, a natural
phenomenon.”).
16. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam).
17. See Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1690
(2013).
18. CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1282 (Lourie, J., concurring).
19. See id. at 1283.
20. See id. at 1303 (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As this
interpretation involves neither “inventive” nor “concept,” it may be fair to say that Judge
Randall Rader viewed “inventive concept” as entirely surplus verbiage.
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The context of history is critical to an understanding of Mayo and the
rest of the Supreme Court’s subject-matter eligibility jurisprudence. For
the Court has turned often to historical practice to justify its decisions;
perhaps the most consistent rationale the Court has invoked for
excluding fundamental principles from patent eligibility is that the
Court has been doing so for over 150 years. 21 In particular, in both
Mayo and Parker v. Flook, 22 the Court has drawn upon English and
American precedent from the nineteenth century to ground the inventive
application requirement. Most notably, the modern Court has relied
extensively on a decision rendered by the Court of Exchequer in 1841,
Neilson v. Harford, 23 that sustained the validity of James Neilson’s
patent to the hot-blast smelting process. 24 Scholarly commentary has
also advanced the argument that nineteenth-century precedent, such as
Neilson and the Supreme Court’s famous opinion in O’Reilly v.
Morse,25 demanded that the application of a fundamental principle be
creative or inventive to qualify for patent eligibility.26
Yet while Neilson has certainly occupied a central role in American
patent jurisprudence since the mid-nineteenth century, modern courts
and commentators have not examined the case in context—context that
was quite familiar to the early American interpreters of Neilson, but is
too often overlooked today. And while modern judges frequently invoke
the great nineteenth-century cases that set the doctrinal foundations of
today’s patent-eligibility doctrine, they have paid too little attention to
the development of that doctrine in the early twentieth century, when
those cases were recent guidance rather than hoary relics. An
examination of these gaps reveals a very different story than the one
told by the Court in Mayo and Flook. For Neilson and its progeny did
not stand for the proposition that only inventive application could
transform a fundamental principle into a patentable invention. In fact,
Neilson stood for the opposite premise: that a patentee’s means of
application might well be trivial and known in the art, yet his discovery
21. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We
have interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in light of this exception for more than 150 years.”).
22. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
23. (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Ex.); see also Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1300–01 (2012) [hereinafter Risch, America’s First Patents] (discussing the
Court’s historical application of Neilson).
24. Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1275.
25. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
26. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and
Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 67–74 (2011) (reviewing nineteenth-century precedent). But see
Richard H. Stern, Mayo v. Prometheus: No Patents on Conventional Implementations of
Natural Principles and Fundamental Truths, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 502, 504 (2012)
(suggesting Neilson’s application was a trivial implementation of his discovery).
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of a new scientific principle would sustain his patent.27 In both England
and the United States, Neilson established the line between principles in
the abstract, which were not patent eligible, and practical applications of
principles, which were.28 That understanding was carried forward through
the early twentieth century in the United States, where it became blackletter law that nearly every practical application of a fundamental principle
might properly be the subject of a patent. It was not until 1948, when the
Supreme Court decided Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,29
that a test of inventive application entered the mainstream of American
patent law.
Part I of this Article briefly traces the development of the Supreme
Court’s modern subject-matter eligibility jurisprudence leading up to
the Court’s statement of the inventive application test in Mayo. Part II
examines in detail not only Neilson, but the related cases in the English
and Scottish courts, showing that the Exchequer sustained Neilson’s
patent not because his application was inventive, but rather because it
was conventional. Part III addresses American developments in the
nineteenth century, examining how Neilson shaped the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence and how the lower courts and authorities of the late
nineteenth century drew the boundary between discovery and invention.
Part IV carries the story into the first half of the twentieth century as
American law continued to differentiate between principles in the
abstract and patent-eligible inventions. Part V then turns to Funk
Brothers and its test of inventive application, and how courts in the
years leading up to Flook implemented Funk Brothers’ standard. This
Article’s Conclusion considers the lessons of this historical survey and
how the patent-eligibility doctrine might move forward from Mayo in
the wake of Alice.
I. THE ROAD TO MAYO: A BRIEF SKETCH
The Supreme Court’s modern patent-eligibility jurisprudence began
with Gottschalk v. Benson 30 in 1972. Benson considered claims to a
method of interconverting between two different representations of
numerical data in computers: binary and binary-coded decimal.31 Benson’s
basic premise was simple: “phenomena of nature,” “mental processes,”
and “abstract intellectual concepts” are not patent eligible.32
But Justice William O. Douglas’s analysis was anything but simple.
In what seems to have become a tradition for the Court, Benson invoked
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1273.
See Risch, America’s First Patents, supra note 23, at 1301.
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Id. at 64.
Id. at 63.
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multiple rationales for unpatentability without definitively committing
to any of them. Much of Justice Douglas’s analysis focused on
tangibility: unlike previous process claims sustained by the Court, the
claimed processes in Benson neither required any particular machinery or
apparatus, nor transformed matter from one state to another.33 Benson also
suggested that as a matter of policy, the decision to “extend” the patent
system to computer programs was for Congress to make, not the Court.34
Yet according to Justice Douglas, Benson “in a nutshell” was about
preemption.35 To grant Benson exclusive use of his claimed process would
effectively preempt all uses of the underlying algorithm: “[I]f the judgment
below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”36
Pursuing a course that might well be commended to today’s courts, the
Court in its next software case declined to address the § 101 question
because the claims were obvious under § 103.37 But in 1978 the Court
tackled the question head on in Parker v. Flook,38 adopting an analysis
entirely different from Benson’s. The claims in Flook were drawn to a
process of calculating an “alarm limit” for the catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons.39 Seeking to distinguish Benson, the applicant pointed out
that his claims did not “wholly pre-empt” the use of a mathematical
algorithm; unlike Benson, where the claims encompassed the only practical
use of the algorithm, the claims in Flook were limited to the use of the
mathematical formulation in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.40
But for Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority of the
Court, the scope of preemption was not the test of patent-eligible
subject matter. Limiting the reach of a claim by adding “conventional or
obvious” steps could not transform a principle into patent-eligible
subject matter. 41 Nor did the Court regard tangibility of the claimed
process as the key to patent eligibility. Rather, Justice Stevens’s
majority opinion held that courts should disregard the mathematical
algorithm, or other underlying principle, when evaluating the eligibility
of claims under § 101.42 Relying on Neilson, Justice Stevens explained
that courts should treat the “principle or mathematical formula”
33. See id. at 70.
34. See id. at 71–73.
35. Id. at 71.
36. Id. at 72.
37. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976) (declining to reach the subject-matter
question because the invention was obvious).
38. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
39. Id. at 585.
40. See id. at 589–90 (agreeing that applicant’s claims did not seek to preempt every use
of the underlying algorithm).
41. Id. at 590.
42. See id. at 591–92.
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underlying a claim, whether previously known or not, “as though it
were a familiar part of the prior art.”43 The patent eligibility of the claim
would then depend on what remained. In particular, subject-matter
eligibility would turn on whether the claim represented an inventive
application of a fundamental principle, such as a law of nature or
mathematical algorithm: “Even though a phenomenon of nature or
mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of
the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a
phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other
inventive concept in its application.”44
The dissenters in Flook 45 protested that Justice Stevens’s approach
wrongly injected notions of novelty and inventiveness, more properly the
domain of §§ 102 and 103, into the subject-matter inquiry.46 And the Flook
dissenters appeared to have won the debate three years later, when the
Court decided Diamond v. Diehr.47 Joined in that case by Justices Byron
White and Lewis Powell as well as the other dissenters in Flook, Justice
William Rehnquist squarely rejected the notion that novelty played any
role in the § 101 inquiry.48 The applicant in Diehr claimed a process for
molding rubber in which a computer continuously monitored the
temperature of the mold and opened the mold once the rubber was fully
cured. 49 The claimed process employed a well-known mathematical
algorithm, the Arrhenius equation, to calculate the curing time based on the
observed temperature in the mold.50 Following the broad construction the
Court had given § 101 the previous Term in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,51
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that only laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas were categorically excluded from patent protection.52 An
industrial process for curing rubber was patent-eligible subject matter, not
an abstract idea, and the involvement of computers or mathematical
formulas in the claim did not detract from this conclusion.53 To be sure,
mathematical formulas, like scientific principles, were not patentable in the
43. Id. at 592.
44. Id. at 594.
45. Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William
Rehnquist. See id. at 598.
46. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
48. See id. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”). But see Flook, 437 U.S. at
591 (“The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful.”).
49. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 178–79.
50. Id. at 178.
51. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
52. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
53. See id. at 188.
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abstract, 54 but whether aspects of the claimed process were novel or
“inventive” were concerns of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness
under § 103, not a concern of subject matter under § 101.55 Nor was it
relevant whether the claims preempted all uses of the underlying
principle.56
Unfortunately Diehr, beginning a pattern that would be repeated in
Mayo, maintained the pretense that all of the Court’s § 101 precedents
were consistent with each other.57 Justice Stevens’s dissent pointed out,
of course, that Flook required the Court to treat the Arrhenius equation
as part of the prior art, and ask whether the claim disclosed a further
“inventive concept.” 58 Given that the steps beyond calculation of the
Arrhenius equation were old, under Flook they could “not constitute a
part of the inventive concept that the applicants claimed to have
discovered.”59 But according to Justice Rehnquist, Flook had held no
such thing. To accept such reasoning would render all inventions
unpatentable “because all inventions can be reduced to underlying
principles of nature which, once known, make their implementation
obvious.”60
And in the face of silence from the Supreme Court, matters remained
in the hands of the lower courts for nearly thirty years. The Court did
not take up the question of patent eligibility again until it decided Bilski
in 2010. Bilski concerned an application for a patent on a business
method: the applicant had claimed a method for “managing the
consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at
a fixed price,” said to be useful for long-term producers and consumers
of commodities such as coal.61
The Supreme Court’s Bilski opinion clarified at least one thing. By a
5–4 majority the Court rejected the approach advocated by Justice
Stevens, who would have excluded “business methods” from the scope
of § 101. 62 Rather, Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized that only
54. See id. at 191.
55. See id. at 191, 193 n.15.
56. See id. at 192 n.14 (“A mathematical formula in the abstract is nonstatutory subject
matter regardless of whether the patent is intended to cover all uses of the formula or only
limited uses.”).
57. Justice Rehnquist would have no such compunctions in an unrelated case decided the
same term as Diehr: “The most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all of these cases
applied a uniform or consistent test under equal protection principles.” U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980) (describing the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence).
58. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 215.
60. Id. at 189 n.12 (majority opinion).
61. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
62. See id. at 3232.
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fundamental principles—laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas—were excluded from patent eligibility under § 101. 63
Beyond that, the Court said little about how to determine whether a
claim was drawn to an abstract idea. Bilski reiterated both Flook’s
suggestion that algorithms should be regarded as part of the prior art,64
and Diehr’s admonition to treat the claims as a whole. 65 The Court
regarded the “machine-or-transformation” test, put forth by the majority
of the Federal Circuit as the exclusive test for patent eligibility, as
merely a “useful and important clue” in deciding the eligibility of a
process under § 101.66 But the Court’s analysis declared that the claims
in suit were nothing more than the abstract concept of hedging, and that
the narrower claims merely provided examples of the use of the abstract
idea in particular contexts.67 The Court’s brief analysis took its cue from
Flook: the claims merely instructed “the use of well-known random
analysis techniques . . . . add[ing] even less to the underlying abstract
principle than the invention in Flook did.”68
Mayo, decided by a unanimous Court two years after Bilski, carried
Bilski’s nod to Flook much further. The Court’s opinion in Mayo did
two things that Bilski did not. First, the Court firmly grounded the
doctrine of subject-matter exclusion, at least in the context of natural
phenomena, as a response to the concern that patents on fundamental
principles would foreclose more innovation than they would promote.69
Such a concern had been among Justice Douglas’s rationales in
Benson.70 Yet in cases after Benson, the Court had tended to invoke the
exclusion of fundamental principles as an unassailable axiom, or to
justify their exclusion on other grounds.71 In Mayo, however, the danger
of granting monopolies on “the basic tools of scientific and
technological work” 72 assumed center stage again. Yet while Justice
Stephen Breyer discussed extensively the policy concern that “patent
law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use

63. See id. at 3229–30 (majority opinion).
64. See id. at 3230.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 3227.
67. See id. at 3231.
68. Id.
69. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1290, 1293
(2012).
70. See supra text accompanying note 36.
71. In Flook, Justice Stevens suggested that a scientific principle was excluded from
patentability because it “reveals a relationship that has always existed,” rather than being the
creation of the inventor. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978).
72. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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of laws of nature,”73 preemption per se did not appear to be the primary
test for patent-eligible subject matter. Preemption concerns “simply
reinforce[d]” the Court’s conclusion that the claimed processes were not
patent-eligible subject matter.74
The second and more significant aspect of Mayo was the test it
articulated for patent eligibility. Hearkening back to Flook, Justice
Breyer explained that a process focusing on a law of nature must “also
contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes
referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent
in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural
law itself.”75 And as had Justice Stevens in Flook, Justice Breyer turned
to the Court of Exchequer’s decision in Neilson to ground his rule.
Quoting at length, Justice Breyer portrayed Neilson as a case in which
the inventor had not merely disclosed a fundamental principle but
instead had “explained how the principle could be implemented in an
inventive way.”76 According to Justice Breyer, the Court of Exchequer
in Neilson had sustained the patent because “the claimed process
included not only a law of nature but also several unconventional
steps . . . that confined the claims to a particular, useful application of
the principle.”77
The Mayo Court therefore appeared to premise patent eligibility on
unconventional application. According to the Court, the relationship
between 6-TG levels and therapeutic efficacy, though triggered by
human action,78 was nothing but a law of nature.79 The additional steps
recited by the claim consisted of “well-understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community.”80
Such conventional activity could not transform an unpatentable law of
nature into a patent-eligible application.81
73. Id. at 1301.
74. Id. at 1302. The Court indicated that the degree to which Prometheus’s claims covered
all processes making use of the correlation between metabolite level and therapeutic efficacy or
the degree to which the claims would interfere with future refinements were not factors in its
analysis. After discussing those concerns, the Court stated: “We need not, and do not, now
decide whether were the steps at issue here less conventional, these features of the claims would
prove sufficient to invalidate them. For here, as we have said, the steps add nothing of
significance to the natural laws themselves.” Id. (emphasis added). The conventionality of the
appended steps, rather than preemption per se, was the failing of the Mayo claims. But the Court
seemed to leave open the possibility that even unconventional applications might be
unpatentable if unduly preemptive.
75. Id. at 1294 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594).
76. Id. at 1300 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. In Mayo, the human action was the administration of a thiopurine drug. Id. at 1296–
97.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1298.
81. See id.
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Such an approach—focusing on whether the inventor’s
implementation of a scientific principle was conventional at the time of
the invention—was clearly contrary to Diehr. While Diehr expressly
separated subject-matter eligibility from questions of novelty and
nonobviousness, the Mayo Court recognized that “in evaluating the
significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and,
say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.”82 Yet as the
Diehr Court maintained that its decision was compatible with Flook, the
Mayo Court likewise maintained that its decision was compatible with
Diehr. According to Mayo, the steps beyond the Arrhenius equation in
Diehr—monitoring the temperature in the mold, feeding that data to a
computer, and opening the mold when the cure was calculated to be
complete—were not, at least in combination, “obvious, already in use,
or purely conventional.” 83 The supposed unconventionality of these
steps meant that the applicants had not attempted to preempt all uses of
the Arrhenius equation. Instead, the applicants had claimed only an
inventive application of the Arrhenius equation.84 In contrast, the steps
in Flook “did not limit the claim to a particular application.” 85 They
were mere “conventional or obvious” activity, evincing no inventive
concept that would transform the underlying principle into a patenteligible process.86
These quotations reveal two intertwined strains of thought in Mayo:
that something more than “conventional or obvious” activity is
necessary to transform a fundamental principle into an inventive
application, and that a claim extending to all applications of a
fundamental principle is not patent eligible. The two are paired
throughout Mayo. For example, in his exegesis of Neilson, Justice
Breyer wrote that the “unconventional steps” confined Neilson’s patent
to “a particular, useful application of the principle.” 87 While Mayo
seems to assume that unconventional steps confine fundamental
principles to particular applications, the two are not necessarily
dependent on each other. Depending on the state of the art, an inventive
application of a fundamental principle might well preempt all practical
applications of that principle (at least at the time of discovery). 88
82. Id. at 1304.
83. Id. at 1299.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 590, 594 (1978) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
87. Id. at 1300; see also id. at 1302 (stating that Prometheus’s claims were invalid because
the steps were conventional, and noting that the claims were not confined to “particular
applications” of underlying laws).
88. Unless some conventional application would invariably be implied by preexisting
nature and science, the time-dependence of the preemption inquiry makes it problematic as a
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Conversely, given the Court’s constant reiteration that field-of-use
restrictions cannot circumvent the prohibition against claiming
fundamental principles,89 the mere fact that steps confine a principle to
a particular application cannot be decisive in the analysis.90
Regardless of whether the ultimate criterion for eligible subject
matter is inventive application, application less extensive than the
underlying principle, or some other test, the notion of inventive
application in the Court’s precedent clearly emerges from a particular
view of historical precedent. In particular, both Flook and Mayo drew
on the Court of Exchequer’s 1841 opinion in Neilson. Flook viewed the
Court’s landmark Morse case as founded upon Neilson, as well as other
foundational nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases,91 such as Risdon
Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart92 and Tilghman v. Proctor.93 One
might assume from the Court’s earlier opinions, as Justice Stevens
argued in his dissent in Diehr, that the distinction between a
fundamental principle and an inventive application of that principle was
“well-established precedent”94 in English and American law. And even
those who would reject the notion of inventive application still turn to
Neilson (particularly through the medium of Morse) to define the
boundary between unpatentable principle and patentable invention.95
II. THE HOT-BLAST CASES
Neilson and related cases were indeed the paradigm cases for debates
over “principle” in both English and American patent jurisprudence in
the nineteenth century. With the long prominence of Neilson in
American patent jurisprudence, and particularly with its recent revival,
it is surprising how poorly understood the case is today. For an
examination of Neilson reveals a very different picture from the one
drawn in Flook and Mayo. Neilson did not stand for the proposition that
criterion for patent eligibility. If, following Bilski, one defines patent eligibility solely in terms
of the excluded categories, the definition of law of nature or abstract idea should not vary
depending on the state of the art. Restricting “inventions” to the products of human creativity,
on the other hand, permits evolution of the category.
89. See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300–01 (explaining that limiting use of a formula to a
particular technological environment does not render it patent eligible).
90. That ambiguity, coupled with the Court’s pretense that Diehr was compatible with the
analysis in Flook and Mayo, led to (or at least permitted) the Federal Circuit’s failure to
articulate a coherent standard for computer-implemented inventions in Alice.
91. Flook, 437 U.S. at 592, 593 n.13.
92. 158 U.S. 68 (1895).
93. 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
94. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173, 216 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (per curiam) (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Morse’s
treatment of Neilson).
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unconventional activity was necessary to transform a newly discovered
principle into a patentable invention. Just the opposite was true: The
patent in Neilson was sustained by the Court of Exchequer not because
the patentee’s application was inventive, but because his application
was entirely routine and conventional. Beginning with Neilson, courts
on both sides of the Atlantic understood the boundary between principle
and invention to reside in practical application, not inventive
application. This Part provides the historical content of the hot-blast
cases, and reveals the true meaning of the famous language from
Neilson that is quoted in Flook and Mayo. It also examines how the hotblast cases came to be the definitive authority on the patentability of
fundamental principles for later English courts and commentators.
A. Antecedents: The Watt Patent and “Principles”
Prior to Neilson, the most extensive discussions of “principle” in
English patent law arose from James Watt’s patent on the improved
steam engine at the very end of the eighteenth century.96 However, these
discussions provided little guidance. Watt’s unfortunate choice of
language in his specification encumbered the litigation over the patent,
particularly at Common Pleas. Watt invented seven separate
improvements to the steam engine. But in his specification, rather than
explicitly describing a steam engine that embodied those improvements,
he instead disclosed seven “principles” upon which steam engines
should be constructed for maximum efficiency.97 These principles were
practical directives for the construction of steam engines, not laws of nature
or scientific truths.98 Nevertheless, by describing his improvements as
principles, he invited extensive debate over whether he claimed a
patentable manufacture or, as contended by the defendants, merely
“unorganized principles.” 99 Common Pleas divided equally over the
issue, largely on disagreement about what the term “principle” actually
meant.100 But King’s Bench agreed that despite Watt’s choice of words,
his patent was not for a principle but a manufacture: an improved steam
engine.101 Thus, it was not necessary for the court to consider “whether
or not mere abstract principles are the subject of a patent.”102

96. Boulton & Watt v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P); Hornblower v. Boulton,
(1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B.).
97. Boulton & Watt, 126 Eng. Rep. at 651, 652.
98. Id. at 659. For example, he explained that the steam cylinder should be kept as hot as
the steam that entered it by enclosing it in an insulated case. Id. at 652.
99. Id. at 655.
100. See id. at 658–70.
101. See Hornblower, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1291.
102. Id. (opinion of Laurence, J.).
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B. The Hot Blast
Just as Neilson v. Harford was a landmark case for English and
American patent law, the technology at issue in Neilson was a landmark
innovation of the Industrial Revolution. The litigation in Neilson v.
Harford, and related cases, originated with Scottish inventor James
Beaumont Neilson’s development of the hot-blast iron smelting process,
which industrial historian Alan Birch described as “the most important
single innovation in the industry in the age of iron.”103 Running counter to
the conventional wisdom that air introduced into the furnace should be as
cold as possible, Neilson proposed preheating the air before feeding it into
the furnace.104 The use of the hot blast revolutionized the production of
iron. Not only did it immediately reduce by two-thirds the fuel required for
smelting,105 perhaps more significantly, it also permitted the use of raw
coal rather than coke for fuel, making the exploitation of lower-quality iron
ores economically feasible.106 The great expansion of iron production in
Wales and Pennsylvania was founded on the hot blast as well because the
process permitted, for the first time, the economical use of local anthracite
deposits as fuel.107
Significantly for the subsequent litigation, Neilson’s patent was short on
detail. His brief specification, for “the improved application of air to
produce heat in fires, forges, and furnaces,” taught that air from a bellows
or other blowing apparatus be directed into “an air vessel or receptacle,”
where it ought to be heated to a “considerable temperature.” 108 The
specification disclosed typical vessel volumes for small-scale operations
and, in the case of larger blast furnaces, that “air vessels of proportionably
increased dimensions and numbers are to be employed.”109 Most significant
for the ensuing litigation, the specification declared that “[t]he form or
shape of the . . . receptacle was immaterial to the effect,” as were the
composition of the air vessel and the manner of applying heat.110
103. ALAN BIRCH, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE BRITISH IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY
1784–1879, at 181 (1968).
104. Paul Belford, Hot Blast Iron Smelting in the Early 19th Century: A Re-Appraisal, 46
HISTORICAL METALLURGY 32, 33 (2012). Paul Belford, a historical archaeologist, notes that
other workers in the field, such as Thomas Botfield, may have been experimenting with hot
blast prior to Neilson. See id. at 37–42.
105. BIRCH, supra note 103, at 183.
106. See id. at 173.
107. See id. at 186; R. D. Corrins, The Great Hot-Blast Affair, in 7 INDUSTRIAL
ARCHAEOLOGY 233–34 (1970); ROBERT B. GORDON & PATRICK M. MALONE, THE TEXTURE OF
INDUSTRY: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF NORTH AMERICA 155–56
(1994).
108. THOMAS WEBSTER, REPORTS AND NOTES OF CASES ON LETTERS PATENT FOR
INVENTIONS 273 (1844) [hereinafter Neilson’s Patent].
109. Id.
110. Id. at 273–74.
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C. The Neilson Case
Neilson v. Harford was only one of some twenty actions asserting
Neilson’s patents against defendants in England and Scotland, and was
not even the largest case.111 After most of a decade in which nearly all the
major iron works had taken a license, Scottish ironmakers led by James
and William Baird organized a coalition of firms to challenge and resist the
Neilson patents. 112 Ironmakers of the coalition agreed to coordinate
litigation strategy and apportion the costs of the defense by volume of
production. 113 The Scottish litigation had begun first, but Neilson v.
Harford, which arose from proceedings against a similar coalition of
English ironmasters, was the first to rule on the validity of Neilson’s
patent.114 Neilson was tried at nisi prius before the Court of Exchequer,
Baron James Parke presiding, from May 4th to May 6th, 1841.115 But
the famous opinion in the case is the June 9th judgment of the full Court
of Exchequer, which heard the case on the plaintiff’s rule after Baron
Parke had directed a verdict in favor of the defendants.116
To understand Neilson, and to understand Neilson’s treatment in
subsequent nineteenth-century patent cases, one must remember the
relatively undeveloped state of patent jurisprudence at the time. English
patent law of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was
plagued by uncertainty about what kind of inventions could be the
subject of patents, and about the role of the patent specification. 117
When patents lacked formal claims, defining “the invention” involved a
holistic examination of the specification and, in some cases, the actual
embodiments or experiments carried out by the patentee.118 Much of the
dispute in Neilson revolved around the nature of the patentee’s
invention. At the time the case was litigated, that inquiry raised at least
three fundamental issues that patent law would recognize as doctrinally
distinct today, but were not clearly differentiated at the time. First, there
was a question that is today the eligibility issue: did Neilson’s patent
claim an unpatentable principle or a patentable invention? Second,
Neilson presented a question of scope: given his disclosure, how far did
111. See Corrins, supra note 107, at 245.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 245–46.
114. See id. at 248. According to R. D. Corrins, the English coalition was in
communication with the Scottish Baird group and adopted similar tactics. See id.
115. Neilson v. Harford, 1 Web. P. C. 295 (1841).
116. Neilson v. Harford, 1 Web. P. C. 331 (1841). The defendants also obtained a rule for a
new trial, but that rule was not sustained by the Court. See Neilson v. Harford, 1 Web. P. C. 328,
329–30 & n.(p) (1841).
117. See H. I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750–1852, at 72–76 (1984).
118. David J. Brennan, The Evolution of English Patent Claims as Property Definers, 4
INTELL. PROP. Q. 361, 362–81 (2005).
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Neilson’s rights extend beyond the apparatus he disclosed? And third, at
least for later courts, the case raised the question of whether a process
could be patented separately from the instrumentalities through which it
operated.
The argument in Neilson was extensive,119 but Baron Parke provided a
relatively brief opinion for the full court.120 The portion that has been the
subject of so much attention from American courts appears at the
beginning of his opinion as a question of “the proper construction to be put
on the specification itself.” 121 Examining the “nature of the invention,”
Baron Parke stated:
It is very difficult to distinguish it from the specification of
a patent for a principle, and this at first created in the minds
of some of the court much difficulty; but after full
consideration, we think that the plaintiff does not merely
claim a principle, but a machine embodying a principle,
and a very valuable one. We think the case must be
considered as if the principle being well known, the
plaintiff had first invented a mode of applying it by a
mechanical apparatus to furnaces; and his invention then
consists in this—by interposing a receptacle for heated air
between the blowing apparatus and the furnace.122
This was the language on which Justice Stevens relied in Flook, for
the proposition that a “principle or mathematical formula” in a claim
should be regarded as “well known”—that is, assumed to be within the
prior art.123 Justice Breyer also reached back to this language in Mayo,
citing it in support of the proposition that only appending
unconventional steps—in the case of Neilson, inserting the receptacle,
applying heat to the receptacle, and blowing the hot air into the
furnace—could transform a new discovery into a patent-eligible
process.124 Describing the legal problem in Neilson as very similar to
the one faced by the Court in Mayo, Justice Breyer explained that the
patent was sustained because Neilson’s invention—his mode of
applying the discovery—consisted of a new and inventive arrangement
of machinery.125
Yet the primary dispute in Neilson was not whether Neilson had
attempted to patent a discovery or law of nature. According to the
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Neilson, 1 Web. P. C. at 331–69.
See id. at 369–73.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 370–71.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1290, 1293 (2012).
Id.
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defendant, Neilson did not even fully understand the principle
underlying the hot blast.126 Both at trial and on appeal, the defendant’s
challenge to the patent hinged almost entirely on inadequate disclosure,
especially Neilson’s failure to specify the form of the heating vessel.127
To scale up the process from the small forges that Neilson had employed, the
defendant found it necessary to route the air through an elaborate system of
cross-connected pipes, which provided sufficient surface area to achieve the
necessary degree of heating.128 Neilson’s patent did not suggest such an
apparatus or even the need to reconfigure the heating vessel when
scaling up the process. To the contrary, Neilson had expressly stated that
the shape of the heating vessel was immaterial to its operation. 129 In
modern terms, the defendant made a straightforward enablement argument:
based on Neilson’s paltry disclosure of a heating vessel, one of ordinary
skill in the art could not practice the invention, at least on an industrial
scale.
Formally, adequacy of the specification was the only issue before the
court on appeal. At trial, Baron Parke had directed a verdict for the
defendant on this question, contrary to the jury’s finding that the
specification sufficiently disclosed the heating apparatus.130 The correctness
of that rule was the grounds of appeal to the full Court of Exchequer.131 So
if the question in Neilson was whether the patentee had adequately
disclosed the invention’s heating apparatus, why was it necessary for the
Court of Exchequer to state that the invention’s principle should be
regarded as “well known”?
Clues to this cryptic phrase may appear upon perusal of Baron
Edward Alderson’s comments during argument of the case. In
discussing the distinction between a patent for a principle and a patent
for a principle embodied in a machine, Baron Alderson elaborated on
126. Neilson, 1 Web. P. C. at 339–40 (defendant’s argument).
127. See, e.g., id. at 339. Defendant’s argument on appeal was the following:
[T]he vice of the specification is, that it directs nothing but the heating of the
vessel, and assumes the heating of the air as a consequence, and yet tells you
that the shape and form of the vessel which is to be heated for the purpose of
producing the result, are quite immaterial to the effect to be produced.
Id.
128. Id. at 304 (defendant’s argument at trial) (describing defendant’s apparatus); id. at 339
(defendant’s argument on appeal) (pointing out the necessity of increasing surface area).
129. See id. at 371 (quoting specification).
130. A special jury had found that Neilson’s specification was sufficient, despite his
statement that the form and shape of the heating vessel was immaterial. See Neilson, 1 Web. P.
C. at 327. Baron Parke directed a verdict for the defendants on that issue, with liberty to the
plaintiffs to move for a rule directing a verdict in their favor. See id. at 327–28.
131. Id. at 331. The defendant secured a rule for a new trial on the same grounds, but that
appeal appears to have been disallowed by the Exchequer. See id. at 330 n.p.
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the idea that the “principle” of the invention should not be regarded, in
the legal sense, as the patentee’s creation:
I have always thought that the real test was this; that in
order to discover whether it is a good or a bad patent, you
should consider that what you cannot take out a patent for
must be considered to have been invented pro bono
publico—that is to say, the principle must be considered as
having had an anterior existence before the patent.132
Considering the principle to have “an anterior existence”—being
well known—was a way to rationalize dedicating the patentee’s
underlying discovery to the public. Baron Alderson was attempting to
reconcile the legal doctrine that the abstract principle behind the
invention was not patentable with the recognition that the discovery of
the principle may have been the real “invention” by the patentee. This is
not a paradox for modern patent doctrine founded on the peripheral
claim. The inventor’s creation and the scope of patent protection are
ontologically quite distinct. But in a time where “invention” and “scope
of protection” were essentially synonymous, it was necessary to explain
how an inventor who had discovered a new principle was nonetheless
not entitled to claim it. Treating the principle as having an anterior
existence was a way to assess whether the patentee was claiming a
principle in the abstract or a mode of practically applying that
principle.133 As Baron Alderson’s application of his test to the patent in
Neilson shows:
Now, here, supposing it had been known that hot air
applied to a furnace was a great improvement on cold air,
and that this person had taken out his patent, and this patent
was a patent for the application of a well-known thing, the
hot air to furnaces; then he takes out a patent for applying
it, by means of an intermediate reservoir between the blast
furnace and the bellows; then surely any body else may
apply the same principle, provided he does not do it by a
reservoir intermediately between the blast furnace and the
bellows, and the question for a jury is, whether or not a

132. Id. at 342 n.(c). Thomas Webster attributes this dialogue to “a subsequent part of the
case.” Id.
133. Because the patentability of methods per se was uncertain when Neilson was decided,
the question of patentability was also bound to the distinction between a claim to an apparatus
and a claim to a method of heating air. See Risch, America’s First Patents, supra note 23, at
1300–01.
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long spiral pipe is a reservoir; if it be not a reservoir, or a
colourable imitation of a reservoir, it is no infringement.134
Thus in Baron Alderson’s view, if the principle of the hot blast was
known, it would be clear that Neilson had claimed not the principle but his
mode of application. The only question remaining would be one of scope:
whether the defendants’ heating apparatus was equivalent to Neilson’s
“reservoir.”
But the key to understanding Baron Parke’s analysis in Neilson is the
Exchequer’s prior opinion in Minter v. Wells,135 which had been decided by
the court in 1834. Minter involved a patent drawn to what must have been
one of the first reclining chairs. The patentee was supposedly the first to
apply a previously known principle—the self-adjusting leverage—to the
back and seat of chairs.136 Like Neilson, Minter had not restricted his claim
to a particular apparatus, instead claiming in general terms the application of
a self-adjusting leverage to chairs.137
On motion for nonsuit, the defendant’s central argument was that the
patent was for “a principle only.” 138 According to the defendant, the
patent attempted to monopolize “one of the first principles in
mechanics,” the self-adjusting lever.139 The Court of Exchequer was not
impressed. As Baron Parke put it:
The claim of the patent is not to the principle, but to the
combination of the principle and the machine—the
application of the self-adjusting lever to the construction of
a chair.140
The patent was therefore drawn to a patentable application, rather than
to an unpatentable principle. Moreover, because the claim was to the
application of the self-adjusting lever to a chair, rather than the particular
mechanism employed, the patent extended to every chair adapting the
principle with similar effect. 141 That included the defendant’s chairs,
which implemented the principle by a different mechanism.142
134. Neilson, 1 Web. P. C. at 342 n.(c). Likewise, Baron Alderson suggests that if Watt’s
discovery had been known prior to his invention, his patent would still be valid. Id.
135. (1834) 149 Eng. Rep. 1180 (Ex.).
136. Id. at 1180.
137. Id.
138. Minter v. Wells, 1 Carp. P. C. 639, 639 (1843).
139. Id. at 641–42; see also Minter v. Wells, 1 Web. P. C. 127, 135 (1834) (“The plaintiff,
by his specification, has appropriated to himself a first principle in mechanics, viz. the lever, and
therefore nobody else may use it.”).
140. Minter, 1 Carp. P. C. at 646.
141. Id. at 642 (Lyndhurst, C.B.) (“Any application of the self-adjusting principle to the
back and seat of a chair producing this effect . . . would be an infringement of this patent, but
nothing short of that.”). That scope may have extended the patent too far; in a subsequent suit
against different defendants, King’s Bench determined that a prior art chair had also embodied a
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In light of the Court of Exchequer’s previous opinion, it becomes
clear that Neilson’s reasoning is simply an extension of Minter’s. In
Minter, the court upheld the patent against the charge that it
monopolized a principle by pointing out that the patent merely claimed
an application of that principle.143 Neilson presented a similar challenge,
except that the patentee had also discovered the principle underlying the
patent. But if one regarded the principle that hot air was better than cold
as “well-known,” then it would appear that his patent was drawn to
something beyond the principle itself: namely, a mode of putting that
principle to practical effect “by interposing a receptacle for heated air
between the blowing apparatus and the furnace.”144 Under Minter, the
patent would be valid subject matter if Neilson had applied a previously
known principle to the blast furnace. To defease Neilson of his patent
because he happened to discover a new principle as well would be a
curious result.145 And if Minter could exclude all chairs embodying the
application of the self-adjusting lever to a chair, was not Neilson
entitled to exclude all processes employing the interposition of a heated
receptacle to preheat the air?
The analogy to Minter was made explicit in proceedings on
Neilson’s Scottish patent, discussed in more detail below. Lord Justice
Clerk John Hope’s summing to the jury used Minter’s case to illustrate
the distinction between principle and application:
[I]t was the application of a well-known principle, but for
the first time applied to a chair. . . . Lord Lyndhurst and the
rest of the court held, that this was not a claim to a
principle, but to the construction of a chair on this
principle, in whatever shape or form it may be constructed.
Just so as to the hot blast, only the principle is also new.146
But Neilson presented a more difficult case than Minter. While
Neilson had suggested that hot air was better than cold, his disclosure
was remarkably short on details concerning the means of heating the

self-adjusting leverage. Minter v. Mower, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 282, 282 (K.B.). Minter was
thereby nonsuited. Id. at 286.
142. See Minter, 1 Carp. P. C. at 641 (defendant’s argument).
143. Minter v. Wells, (1834) 149 Eng. Rep. 1180, 1180 (Ex.) (“The defendant has confined
himself . . . to the benefit of the principle.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144. Neilson v. Harford, 1 Web. P. C. 331, 371 (1841).
145. See also Lord Justice Clerk John Hope’s comments in Househill Coal & Iron Co. v.
Neilson. 1 Web. P.C. 673, 684 (1843) (“It would be very strange and unjust to refuse [a patent
applying a principle], when the inventor has the additional merit of discovering the principle as
well as its application to a practical object.”).
146. Id. at 686 (footnote omitted) (Lord Justice Clerk Hope’s instruction to the jury at
trial).
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air,147 or any other aspect of the process for that matter.148 For the Court
of Exchequer, this raised the question of whether Neilson was
attempting to patent a naked principle—in which case his patent was
bad—or a practical mode of carrying that principle into effect—in
which case his patent was good.149
And that is the great irony of the Supreme Court’s treatment of
Neilson in Mayo, where Justice Breyer suggested that Neilson’s patent
was sustained because his mode of application was unconventional and
inventive. 150 The Court of Exchequer sustained Neilson’s patent not
because his application was inventive, but because his application was
entirely conventional. In refuting the defendant’s challenge based on
lack of disclosure, both the patentee and the court hammered away at
the point that Neilson’s instrumentalities were known and conventional
in the field. As the patentee argued:
The mode of heating air was perfectly well known; it was
no discovery of Mr. Neilson’s, every body knew it. Air had
been heated, and there had been different shaped vessels
employed for heating the air; for heating the air
economically, and for heating it to a higher or lesser degree
of temperature; all that was perfectly well known.151
Or as Baron Alderson responded to the defendant’s charge:
The blowing apparatus was perfectly well known; the
heating of air was perfectly well known; the twire was
perfectly well known as applicable to blast furnaces; then
what he really discovered is, that it would be better for you
to apply air heated up to red heat, or nearly so, instead of
cold air as you have hitherto done. That is the principle;
that is the real discovery; but, in order to take out a patent,
you must have an embodiment of the principle, and his
embodiment of the principle is the heating of air in a

147. Neilson’s specification stated the approximate size of the air vessel for “an ordinary
smith’s fire or forge,” and that for blast furnaces and the like “air vessels of proportionably
increased dimensions and numbers are to be employed. The form or shape of the vessel or
receptacle is immaterial to the effect, and may be adapted to the local circumstances or
situation.” Neilson’s Patent, supra note 108, at 273.
148. As to temperature, Neilson directed, “It is better that the temperature be kept to a red
heat or nearly so, but so high a temperature is not absolutely necessary to produce a beneficial
effect.” Id.
149. Neilson, 1 Web. P. C. at 342.
150. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1290, 1300
(2012).
151. Neilson, 1 Web. P. C. at 344 (patentee’s argument on appeal).
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separate vessel, intermediately between the blowing
apparatus and the point where it enters the furnace.152
The point of these arguments was twofold. The first was a direct
response to the defendant’s inadequate-disclosure challenge. If the
instrumentalities for heating were old and well known in the field, and if
one of ordinary skill in the art could construct various means of heating
the air, then the defendant’s enablement challenge failed. Because the
jury had expressly found that a “competent workman” could design an
air vessel to provide the necessary heating of air, Neilson’s patent was
not invalid for lack of adequate disclosure.153
The second was to identify precisely what Neilson’s patent
embraced. Had Neilson merely claimed the abstract principle that hot
air was better than cold? If so, his patent was invalid as drawn to a mere
“principle.” There had been serious doubt, at least in Baron Alderson’s
mind, whether Neilson had sufficiently disclosed any practical mode of
application.154 That doubt is likely what Baron Parke had been referring
to when he stated that “some of the court” had “much difficulty” in
distinguishing Neilson’s patent from a patent on a principle.155 But the
Exchequer ultimately concluded that Neilson had claimed not a
principle but a mode of application—the interposition of a heated vessel
between the blower and the furnace.156 The practical difference between
a patent drawn to “interposing a receptacle for heated air” 157 and a
patent drawn to “hot air is better than cold”158 may appear slight. Yet it
was sufficient for the Court of Exchequer to regard Neilson’s patent as
drawn to more than a mere principle. And having disclosed enough to
enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice that mode, Neilson’s
patent extended to any process that drew air through a heated receptacle
before introducing it into the blast—regardless of the shape or size of
the heating vessel.

152. Id. at 337 (interposition of Baron Alderson).
153. Id. at 372.
154. See id. at 342 (interposition of Baron Alderson) (“The difficulty which presses on my
mind here is, that this party has taken out a patent, in substance like Watt’s, for a principle, that
is, the application of hot air to furnaces, but he has not practically described any mode of
carrying it into effect.”).
155. Id. at 371.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1854) (positing that had this been
the construction of the patent in Neilson, “the court, it appears, would have held this patent to be
void”).
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D. The Hot-Blast Cases Following Neilson
Opinions in the other hot-blast cases immediately following Neilson
leave no doubt: contemporaneous courts did not interpret Neilson as
demanding unconventional application, nor prior art treatment of
fundamental principles. The first case arising from the efforts of the
Baird coalition in Scotland was Neilson v. Househill Coal & Iron
Co., 159 although the Bairds themselves had not yet been sued. 160 The
case was tried before the Court of Session in April 1842.161 Although it was
not entirely clear if the defendant’s plea properly raised the issue,162
Lord Justice Clerk Hope laid before the jury the question of whether
Neilson’s patent was an unpatentable principle or a patentable application:
It is quite true that a patent cannot be taken out solely for
an abstract philosophical principle—for instance, for any
law of nature, or any property of matter, apart from any
mode of turning it to account in the practical operations of
manufacture, or the business, and arts, and utilities of life.
The mere discovery of such a principle is not an invention,
in the patent law sense of the term. . . . But a patent will be
good, though the subject of the patent consists in the
discovery of a great, general, and most comprehensive
principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is by
the specification applied to any special purpose, so as
thereby to effectuate a practical result and benefit not
previously attained.163
But was that distinction founded on whether the patentee’s
application of the principle was inventive rather than conventional?
The main merit, the most important part of the invention,
may consist in the conception of the original idea—in the
discovery of the principle in science, or of the law of
nature, stated in the patent, and little or no pains may have
been taken in working out the best manner and mode of the
application of the principle to the purpose set forth in the
patent.164
Far from endorsing the position that the application of the principle
must be inventive, Lord Justice Clerk Hope emphatically denied it.
Though the new scientific discovery or law of nature was not patentable
in the abstract, it was the discovery that conferred “merit” on the
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

(1842) 14 Scottish Jurist 626.
See Corrins, supra note 107, at 246–47.
See Househill, 14 Scottish Jurist at 630.
Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Neilson, 1 Web. P. C. 673, 677 (1843).
Id. at 683.
Id. (emphasis added).
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invention. Developing the application may well have been trivial in
light of the discovery, but it nonetheless sufficed to transform the
abstract principle into a patentable invention.165 Following the Court of
Exchequer, Lord Justice Clerk Hope concluded that the true invention
was the patentee’s mode of carrying his principle into effect, 166 and
Neilson’s patent was therefore not confined to the particular form of the
apparatus he constructed or disclosed.167
Upon the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the Court of Session’s
Second Division rejected the defendants’ exception to Lord Justice
Clerk Hope’s charge.168 It is plain from the Court’s opinions that the
judges regarded Neilson’s invention not as the particular mode or
apparatus for preheating air, but rather the heating of air between the
blower and the furnace. 169 Such a patent could be sustained, as Lord
James Moncreiff put it, “as long as it is clear that there is a principle
discovered, and a mechanical process for carrying that principle into
operation pointed out.”170 The implications of Lord Moncreiff’s statement
are clear: the principle was what the inventor had discovered, and was the
foundation of the invention. 171 A mode of application was certainly
necessary for the patent, but the application was something the inventor
pointed out, not discovered. And the Court of Session’s decision seems
to have settled the matter. The appeal to the House of Lords turned
entirely on a question of prior use; the other issues were argued
cursorily,172 and the judges seemingly regarded them as either waived
by the defendant or settled conclusively by Neilson.173
The Bairds finally took the field on their own account against
Neilson in 1843. The trial at the Court of Session lasted for a record ten
days, took testimony from over a hundred witnesses, and was litigated
by many of the leading attorneys of the time.174 Unlike Househill, the
question of whether Neilson had claimed a principle was raised directly,
165. Lord Justice Clerk Hope proceeded to reason by analogy to Minter: if a new
application of a well-known principle yielded “a practical result for a special purpose,” then “[i]t
would be very strange and unjust to refuse the same legal effect, when the inventor has the
additional merit of discovering the principle as well as its application to a practical object.” Id.
at 684.
166. Id. at 685.
167. See id. at 685–86 (analogizing the case to Minter).
168. Neilson v. Househill Coal & Iron Co., (1842) 14 Scottish Jurist 626, 653.
169. See id. at 650 (Moncreiff, L.J.).
170. Id. at 651.
171. See id. at 650 (“There is not any doubt, that, at the bottom of the invention, there is the
principle, that a blast of hot air will produce more heat in a furnace than a blast of cold air.”).
172. Househill, 1 Web. P. C. at 699–702 (appellate argument).
173. See id. at 701 (Campbell, L.J.) (questioning whether the issue of principle was
properly raised); id. at 715 (following Baron Parke’s opinion from the Court of Exchequer).
174. See Corrins, supra note 107, at 250.
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as Lord Justice General David Boyle directed the jury that the patent
was not to an abstract principle.175 The defendants having excepted to
that instruction, that question was also before the First Division of the
Court of Session on appeal when the defendants brought their bill of
exceptions, following a jury verdict in Neilson’s favor.176 Yet the judges
of the court regarded the legal question as conclusively settled by
Neilson and Househill: the patent might be founded on the discovery of
a principle, but if the inventor had disclosed a practical mode of
applying the principle, the patent was good.177
While agreeing that the patentee must disclose his mode of
application, none of the judges suggested that the mode need be novel
or inventive. It was sufficient if the patentee disclosed a practical mode.
As Lord Francis Jeffrey put it, in refuting the defendants’ argument:
It seemed to be argued, that because the chief and essential
part of a discovery might consist in a principle, that on that
account the reward due for what may have proved of the
highest possible benefit to the country is to be
withheld. . . . No doubt, if the discovery was for some very
general principle, such as the law of gravitation, for that a
patent could not be taken out. . . . You must show, in order
to obtain a patent, . . . a discovery that is of use for certain
economical purposes, for increasing the wealth or
conducing to the comfort of the inhabitants, and for that

175. Boyle’s instruction was as follows:
2. That the patent is not void, as being merely for an abstract philosophical
principle which the law does not acknowledge, because it combines a principle
with the special purpose and important result of having atmospheric air heated
in a vessel or receptacle between the blowing apparatus and fires, forges and
furnaces, into which it is introduced, as an improved application of air to
produce heat.
Neilson v. Baird, (1843) 15 Scottish Jurist 618, 618. Boyle also directed that the patent claimed
no particular mode of heating air or form of heating vessel. See id. (third instruction).
176. See id. at 619.
177. See id. at 622 (Fullerton, L.) (“Then as to the abstract principle, the question is settled
both by [the Court of Exchequer] and by the Lord Chancellor. The patent was not for a general
property, but for a mechanical contrivance, viz., for heating the receptacle between the blast and
the furnace.”); id. at 619–20 (Mackenzie, L.) (providing that a valid patent must, in addition to
discovery, contain the invention of a practical mode of application); id. at 626 (Boyle, L.P.). The
judges also regarded the Court of Chancery’s revival of the injunction against Harford,
following the Exchequer’s decision in Neilson v. Harford, as the Lord Chancellor’s endorsement
of the reasoning in Neilson. See id. at 619; id. at 626. Hearing Neilson v. Harford in Chancery,
Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst had agreed with the Exchequer’s construction of the specification.
See Neilson v. Harford, 1 Web. P. C. 331, 373–74 (1841).
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reason you must describe the application of the
discovery.178
And that description was necessary even if disclosure of the principle
would make its application self-evident:
[A]lthough its use and application might be perfectly
evident on that very announcement, so that all persons
having common information could easily devise a mode of
carrying it into operation; still, in order to satisfy the law, it
is necessary that the method by which this is to be done
must be set forth.179
Lord Jeffrey’s framing of the doctrine cannot be reconciled with the
argument that the hot-blast cases imposed a requirement for inventive
application. A rule that a patent must disclose even a self-evident
application of a new discovery would make no sense, unless selfevident applications were themselves patent-eligible subject matter.
The Court of Session’s decision effectively ended resistance to
Neilson’s patents. Upon rejection of their bill of exceptions, the Bairds
settled with Neilson for £100,000 plus his costs.180 And that decision
leaves no doubt about how English and Scottish jurists understood
Neilson, and how they viewed the distinction between unpatentable
principle and patentable invention. Principles in the abstract were not
patentable but practical applications were. It was necessary for the
patentee to disclose and claim the mode of application, but that
application need not be nonobvious or unconventional. The merit of the
invention lay in the discovery. The application, in Lord Jeffrey’s words,
might well be “perfectly evident” and easily devised once the principle
was known.
E. The Hot-Blast Cases in Subsequent English Law
While the hot-blast cases became central to discussions of patenteligible subject matter in United States patent law, American courts paid
little attention to developments in English law after the Neilson cases. But
in England, Neilson and Househill remained the benchmark cases for the
distinction between unpatentable principle and patentable invention
throughout the nineteenth century. And Neilson clearly represented a

178. Baird, 15 Scottish Jurist at 623 (Jeffrey, L.).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. The Bairds had given notice of their intent to appeal to the House of Lords, but settled
before any appeal was heard. See Corrins, supra note 107, at 256–57. The settlement prompted
further disputes among the members of the anti-Neilson coalition as to whether those damages,
or just the legal expenses alone, should be borne pro rata by the members. See id. at 257–58.
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requirement for practical application, not inventive application.181 Given
that the Exchequer’s opinion rested on the determination that Neilson’s
means were well-known and conventional, Neilson stood for the
proposition that a patentee’s means of application might well be trivial.
David Fulton’s treatise summarized this view of Neilson in 1902:
It was not and cannot be pretended that [Neilson’s] airheating
means
involved
any
invention
at
all. . . . [W]herever it is a question of claiming anything
which seems to be of the nature of a principle, the rule is to
claim it in conjunction with and as effected by the means
for carrying the principle into effect, however simple and
self-evident such means may be.182
It was clear that “principles in the abstract” were not patentable, but
the conjunction of a new principle and a mode of carrying it into effect
was patentable. Novelty of principle, rather than of means, sufficed.
According to Robert Frost’s 1891 treatise:
Principles in a concrete form, together with a method of
applying them to a new and useful purpose, may form the
subject of a grant of letters patent. In other words, a new
principle or a new idea as regards any art or manufacture,
together with a mode of carrying it into practice, may be
patented, though the idea alone, and very likely the
machine alone, because the machine might not be new, is
not proper subject-matter.183
Therefore, according to Frost, “[i]t is not necessary that the means, as
well as the principle, should be new, for the novelty of the invention
consists in applying the new principle by the means specified.”184
Notably, none of the post-Neilson case law, nor any of the English
authorities, ever suggested that Baron Parke’s famous passage required
fundamental principles to be treated as part of the prior art, nor
unconventional application. English courts and commentators never
reached Flook and Mayo’s interpretations of Neilson.

181. For a modern interpretation of Neilson and Househill as abstraction cases, see Norman
Siebrasse, The Rule Against Abstract Claims: History and Principles, 26 CAN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 205, 210 (2011).
182. DAVID FULTON, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND
DESIGNS 41 (1902) (emphasis added). Fulton regarded Boulton & Watt v. Bull as setting forth
the same doctrine, though Watt’s means, unlike Neilson’s, “might have called for the exercise of
the inventive faculties.” Id. at 42.
183. ROBERT FROST, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LETTERS PATENT FOR
INVENTIONS 48 (1891)
184. Id. at 55.

2015]

INVENTIVE APPLICATION: A HISTORY

593

As in the United States, later English cases founded upon the hotblast cases eventually supplanted them. Cases such as Otto v. Linford185
became more canonical than Neilson for the line separating principle
and invention. Yet Otto rests almost entirely upon the hot-blast cases for
that point. And the doctrine that invention may subsist in the obvious
application of a new discovery has remained the law in the English
courts to the present day. In Genentech, Inc.’s Patent,186 Justice John
Whitford of the Patents Court explained:
It is trite law that you cannot patent a discovery, but if on
the basis of that discovery you can tell people how it can be
usefully employed, then a patentable invention may result.
This in my view would be the case, even though once you
have made the discovery, the way in which it can be
usefully employed is obvious enough.187
The Court of Appeal agreed; as Lord Justice Brian Dillon put it, the
proposition “that the application of the discovery is only patentable if
the application is itself novel and not obvious” would “represent a
drastic change from English law as previously understood.”188 Justice
Whitford’s view of the law was later quoted with approval by the House
of Lords. 189 Thus it is clear that in the land of its birth, Neilson has
always been understood, not as a requirement for unconventional
application, but merely as a requirement for practical application in
questions of patent-eligible subject matter.
III. THE HOT-BLAST CASES AND SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The premise that principles or abstract discoveries could not be
patented was a part of American patent jurisprudence prior to Neilson
and the other hot-blast cases. But the American patent law precepts
regarding the distinction between an unpatentable principle and a
patentable invention developed out of Neilson. This Part examines these
trends through the rest of the nineteenth century, first in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, then in the lower courts, and finally in scholarly treatises.
185. [1882] 46 L.T. (N.S) 35.
186. [1987] R.P.C. 553, 566 (Eng.).
187. Id.
188. Genentech, Inc.’s Patent, [1989] R.P.C. 147, 239–40 (Dillon, L.J.). Lord Justice
Francis Purchas agreed. See id. at 206–13. Lord Justice Michael Mustill questioned whether this
interpretation was consistent with § 1(2)(a) of the Patents Act of 1977, see id. at 267–69, but
assumed that it was for purposes of the appeal. See id. at 270; see also Gale’s Application,
[1991] R.P.C. 305, 312–14 (Nicholls, L.J.); id. at 330–31 (Parker, L.J.) (explaining that obvious
application of a new discovery may be a patentable invention).
189. Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, ¶ 76 (Hoffman,
L.).
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A. Neilson at the Supreme Court
Even before Neilson was decided, American case law had concluded
that principles or abstract discoveries could not be patented.190 But in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, the hot-blast cases became
authoritative for American courts seeking to divine the line between
principle and invention. Henry Merwin, writing of Neilson in 1883,
claimed that “its correctness has never been doubted or denied.”191 One
cannot understand foundational nineteenth-century American cases
without understanding Neilson and its companion cases; the Supreme
Court judged the patents before it by analogy or comparison to
Neilson’s patent.
Though American courts cited Neilson as early as 1844,192 the Supreme
Court’s first significant engagement with the Neilson cases came in 1852,
with Le Roy v. Tatham.193 Le Roy later became the fountainhead of subjectmatter exclusion in American patent law, via its oft-quoted (and largely
tautological) pronouncement on the unpatentability of principles: “A
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right.”194
But far less often quoted is what follows that pronouncement—
Justice John McLean’s statement distinguishing between an
unpatentable principle and a patentable application. According to
Justice McLean, under the laws of both England and the United States:
A new property discovered in matter, when practically
applied, in the construction of a useful article of commerce
or manufacture, is patentable; but the process through
which the new property is developed and applied, must be
stated, with such precision as to enable an ordinary
mechanic to construct and apply the necessary process.195
That is, a practical application of a new discovery was patentable so
long as the patentee enabled the stated application. Justice McLean’s
formulation echoes Lord Moncreiff’s: the new property was discovered,
but the patentee’s mode of application is merely stated. There is no
190. See Risch, America’s First Patents, supra note 23, at 1304–07 (describing early
exclusion of abstract principles); In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 286, 288 (C.C.D.C. 1841) (No. 7687)
(“[N]o discovery will entitle the discoverer to a patent which does not in effect amount to the
contrivance or production of something which did not exist before; or, in other words, to an
invention.”).
191. HENRY CHILDS MERWIN, THE PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONS 539 (1883).
192. See, e.g., Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 325 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 17,214).
193. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853).
194. Id. at 175.
195. Id.
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doubt that Le Roy turned to the hot-blast cases for the distinction
between abstract principles and patentable invention. Referring not to
Neilson but to Househill, Justice McLean quoted Lord Justice Clerk
Hope’s opinion for the proposition that one could patent a discovery or
principle “if that principle is by the specification applied to any special
purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result and benefit not
previously attained.”196 One could therefore patent a new application of
a natural principle without being limited to—or without having
invented—the apparatus involved so long as the specification was
sufficiently enabling.197
Le Roy itself was not decided on patent-eligibility grounds. The
patentee in Le Roy had discovered a way to manufacture wrought pipe
by extruding metal through a die, improving on the casting typically
employed before. 198 The patentee’s difficulty was that, although he had
based his invention on the discovery that solid lead will re-anneal under heat
and pressure, a similar apparatus existed in the prior art for the manufacture
of clay pipes, and even macaroni.199 The trial judge instructed the jury that
the patentee’s invention lay not in his machinery, but in first applying a
newly discovered principle to the manufacture of wrought pipe, which
made the invention novel. 200 The majority of the Supreme Court
rejected this interpretation, holding instead that the patentee had
claimed only the combination of machinery used to form the pipes.201
The outcome in Le Roy therefore turned entirely on the Court’s
narrow construction of the claim. The question of whether a broader
claim, drawn from the application of the newly discovered property of
lead to the manufacture of pipes, might be sustained “was not in the
case,”202 though Justice Samuel Nelson’s dissent advocated vigorously
for the patentability of such a claim.203 So in the end, all of Le Roy’s
pronouncements on “principle” were dicta. Le Roy nonetheless shows
that the Court drew from the hot-blast cases the doctrine that discovery
of a principle, if applied to any practical purpose, will sustain a patent
196. Id. (quoting Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Neilson, 1 Web. P. C. 673, 683 (1843)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
197. See id. at 176 (stating that “precise specification” is required if a patentee has
achieved a result without the invention of any machinery).
198. Id. at 177–78 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 164 (majority opinion).
200. See id. at 176.
201. See id. (quoting the claim of patent)
202. Id. at 177. According to Justice McLean’s majority opinion, the patent expressly
claimed the described machinery, not the process of manufacture. See id. 176–77. Consequently,
the invention might lack novelty over the clay pipe and macaroni machines. See id. at 177.
203. Id. at 183–88 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Justice Nelson did not view the majority as
contesting that view, see id. at 188, although he would have construed the patent to cover the
application of the annealing property rather than the machinery. See id. at 181–82.
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without regard to the particular means employed.204 Indeed, when the
case was retried (in equity) and reached the Supreme Court again,
Justice McLean sustained the patent despite the admitted lack of novelty
of the patentee’s machinery.205
The Supreme Court discussed Neilson at length in O’Reilly v.
Morse,206 when it considered Morse’s patent on the telegraph. The case
is memorable today for Morse’s infamous eighth claim, which
attempted to cover every use of electromagnetism for writing at a
distance.207 The hot-blast cases were Morse’s principal support for his
claim in his argument before the Court: just as Neilson’s patent was
thought to encompass any use of hot air in the blast furnace, so too
could Morse’s patent encompass any use of electromagnetism for
writing at a distance.208
Morse has often been regarded as a case about the unpatentability of
scientific discoveries and laws of nature, such as electromagnetism.209 The
Court’s modern opinions regard Morse, along with Le Roy, as the historical
foundation of its subject-matter jurisprudence; it was Morse—and Morse’s
treatment of Neilson in particular—that provided the foundation for Justice
Stevens’s treatment of principles as part of the prior art in Flook. 210
Because so much of Morse’s discussion revolves around Neilson, an
understanding of the hot-blast cases is crucial to understanding the
Supreme Court’s discussion of fundamental principles in Morse.
Certainly Morse, like Le Roy, proclaims the unpatentability of
fundamental principles in the abstract. The Court grounded this doctrine
in Neilson. According to the Court, if Neilson’s patent had been directed
to the discovery that hot air is better than cold, the Exchequer “would
have held his patent to be void; because the discovery of a principle in
natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable.” 211 As the
204. See id. at 175 (majority opinion) (quoting Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Neilson, 1
Web. P. C. 673, 683 (1843)).
205. Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 132, 141 (1860). Strangely enough, McLean
appeared to reach a different construction than the one he set forth in the original case. McLean
held that while the machinery was old, the patentee claimed it only in connection with the
process of forming metal pipes under heat and pressure. Id. at 138–40. This seems close to the
position of the dissent in the original case. See Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 188 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
The argument on novelty thereby being negated, the patent was sustained in light of its enabling
disclosure. Le Roy, 63 U.S (22 How.) at 140–41. Merwin described the opinion in the second
case as “so extremely obscure that it cannot be quoted as supporting any view of the law upon
the subject of principle.” MERWIN, supra note 191, at 576.
206. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 62, 114–16, 131–32 (1854).
207. See id. at 77–78. The validity of the eighth claim was actually relevant only to the
question of costs, the other claims in the patent being valid and infringed. Id. at 119–20, 123–24.
208. See id. at 114–16 (stating that the Neilson cases were patentee’s principal argument).
209. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 26, at 67–68.
210. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 592 (1978) (citing Le Roy and Morse).
211. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115–16.
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Court pointed out, the Exchequer would not have sustained Neilson’s
patent if it had claimed a discovery rather than a practical mode of
application.212
Why, then, was Morse’s eighth claim denied where Neilson’s had
been sustained? The distinction was not that Neilson had claimed an
inventive means. The Court was quite clear that Neilson’s application
did not involve a particular apparatus: “Neilson claimed no particular
mode of constructing the receptacle, or of heating it.”213 If the Court
understood that Neilson had claimed no particular form or arrangement
of the heating receptacle, then of course the Court could not have
regarded his invention as founded upon an inventive or unconventional
apparatus.214
The difference was simply enablement. As the Court explained, in
Neilson the jury had found that once Neilson disclosed the heating of air
between the blower and the furnace, one of ordinary skill in the art
could easily construct a heating vessel of the appropriate size and form.
Neilson, according to the Court, had disclosed enough to enable the
universal application of his discovery, independent of the particular
means that he employed. 215 Morse had not. His invention depended
upon “complicated and delicate machinery, adjusted and arranged upon
philosophical principles, and prepared by the highest mechanical
skill.”216 Unlike Neilson’s heating vessel, Morse’s telegraphic apparatus
was not independent of form.217
Once we understand, as the Morse Court did, that Neilson was an
enablement case, then the true nature of Morse becomes clear. Like
Neilson, Morse is about disclosure and scope, not patent-eligible subject
matter. To put it in modern terms, Neilson’s disclosure enabled the full
scope of his claims, whereas Morse’s did not. That factual difference
between the patents, which the Court well appreciated, is the key to
understanding the Court’s opinion in Morse.
Of course, the Court did not decide Le Roy and Morse in a vacuum.
In particular, the cases coincided with the Court’s evolution of the
212. See id. at 116 (noting that the Exchequer “emphatically denied” that Neilson would
have the right to the general discovery that hot air promoted ignition better than cold).
213. Id. at 115.
214. See id. at 116 (“The interposition of a heated receptacle, in any form, was the novelty
he invented.” (emphasis added)).
215. See id. at 116–17 (“And this effect was always produced, whatever might be the form
of the receptacle, or the mechanical contrivances for heating it, or for passing the current of air
through it, and into the furnace.”).
216. Id. at 117. This mechanism was, of course, inventive. This fact highlights the
implausibility of treating Morse as a case about the patent eligibility of discoveries absent
inventive application. Morse did not pretend to have discovered electromagnetism, nor was his
application of electromagnetism routine or conventional. Yet his claim was denied.
217. Id. at 116–17.
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nonobviousness requirement. 218 Two years before Le Roy and three
years before Morse, the Court decided Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 219
articulating, for perhaps the first time, a requirement for human
creativity and ingenuity in patentable invention. 220 In contrast, when
Neilson and the other hot-blast cases were decided, English law had no
clear requirement for ingenuity. English courts of the early nineteenth
century had suggested that “substantial” or “material” novelty—not
necessarily entailing ingenuity or creativity—was necessary for
patentability, but by 1842 they seemed to embrace the doctrine that
novelty and utility sufficed.221 Thus, at the time the Exchequer decided
Neilson, trivial but novel applications of a well-known principle might
have been regarded as patentable under English law.
On this argument, it would make no difference if Neilson discovered
the underlying principle of the hot blast or not; any novel application
would have been patentable.222 Granting that Neilson and the other hotblast cases rejected the notion of inventive application, does Hotchkiss’s
requirement for invention and creativity signal a departure from the
reasoning of Neilson as well, along with a distinctly American demand
that invention lie in the application, and not the discovery, of
fundamental principles?223
The English courts, of course, continued to reject that argument long
after they evolved their own doctrine of inventive step. 224 But it is
certainly possible to formulate a coherent doctrine along these lines: An
invention is the product of human creativity. Discovery of fundamental
principles is not human creativity. Therefore, discovery without

218. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2007).
219. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
220. Sarnoff, supra note 26, at 69.
221. See Duffy, supra note 218, at 32–33 (describing erosion of the standard of invention
in English law). English law later embraced the American conception of obviousness in a series
of decisions in 1889 and 1890. See id. at 53–58.
222. Though I raise this argument as an objection to my account, it is not entirely
convincing. For one, the rejection of ingenuity may not have been complete, at least at midcentury. Some English commentators of the 1850s treated “ingenuity” as necessary, at least in
the application of old devices to new ends. See JAMES JOHNSON & J. HENRY JOHNSON, THE
PATENTEE’S MANUAL: A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 14–
16 (6th ed. 1890) (discussing the requirement of ingenuity). Moreover, as befell Minter, the
patentee who broadly claimed the application of a known principle was vulnerable to
anticipation by another who had employed the same mode, but with a different apparatus. See
supra note 141 and accompanying text.
223. See Sarnoff, supra note 26, at 69–70 (connecting Hotchkiss’s demand for creativity
with creative application).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 182–89. Inventive step is the English analogue of
nonobviousness.
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additional human creativity is not invention.225 But while the syllogism
is logically correct, historical support for the minor premise is difficult
to find. Justice Nelson wrote the Hotchkiss opinion. Yet it was Justice
Nelson whose dissent in Le Roy argued forcefully against any
requirement for novelty in the means of application:
The original conception—the novel idea in the one case, is
the new application of the principle or property of matter,
and the new product in the arts or manufactures—in the
other, in the discovery of the principle or property, and
application, with like result. The mode or means are but
incidental, and flowing naturally from the original
conception; and hence of inconsiderable merit.226
That the author of Hotchkiss rejected a requirement for creative
application two years later in Le Roy does not preclude the possibility
that such a conception developed later in the century. Yet those writers
near the end of the nineteenth century who focused the most on the
mental process of invention—Henry Merwin and William Robinson—
were those who most expressly denied that additional creativity was
necessary to transform a discovery into an invention. 227 So while it
would be logically permissible to reject the doctrine espoused by the
English courts on the basis of a new requirement for human creativity
and ingenuity, there is little evidence that American courts followed that
path in the nineteenth century.228
225. This formulation is probably the foundation of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013), Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012), and
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–91 (1978).
226. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 187 (1853) (Nelson, J., dissenting). See
also id. at 185–88 (arguing that the discoverer of a principle was not confined to his mode of
application). As noted above, Justice Nelson maintained that the majority opinion did not
controvert this view. See id. at 188. Justice Nelson also joined Justice Robert Grier’s dissent in
Morse. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 124 (1854) (Grier, J., dissenting).
227. See infra text accompanying notes 276–94.
228. Professor Joshua Sarnoff has also suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Electric Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11, 18–19 (1892), which denied
patentability to a new but analogous use of an old product, entailed a requirement for creative
application. See Sarnoff, supra note 26, at 77–78. One might argue that if discovery alone could
confer patentability, then the discovery of a new property leading to an analogous use ought to
be patentable. The Court’s restriction to non-analogous uses (demanding inventive skill) in
Ansonia Brass would indicate a restriction to inventive or creative applications. However, as
Professor Stefan Riesenfeld pointed out, Ansonia Brass is phrased in terms of “patentable
novelty” and “invention” rather than subject matter as such. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New
United States Patent Act in the Light of Comparative Law I, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 298 n.45
(1954). The Court’s subsequent decisions on new uses treated the question of eligibility versus
invention inconsistently. See Lothar Wachsner, Patentability of New Uses, 34 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 397, 401–03 (1952). Moreover, if the prohibition against double uses embodied a
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Neilson last received significant consideration at the Supreme Court
in 1880, in Tilghman v. Proctor.229 In Tilghman, the Court considered a
claim to a process of separating glycerine and various triglycerides from fat
by heat and water, which was not restricted to a particular apparatus or
precise reaction conditions. 230 The Court’s decision in Tilghman
established that processes could be patented apart from their physical
instrumentalities, thus reversing its earlier decision in Mitchell v.
Tilghman,231 where the Court had confined the patent to the particular
conditions and machinery disclosed.232 Once again, the Court turned to
Neilson for support. According to the Court, Neilson’s patent was
sustained as a patent for a process.233 As in Morse, the key for the Court
was the independence of Neilson’s patent from the particular apparatus
he disclosed.234 Like Neilson, Tilghman had not disclosed the apparatus
necessary to implement his process on an industrial scale.235 But for the
Court, Baron Parke’s opinion in Neilson pointed the way:
[The Court of Exchequer] drew the true distinction between
a mere principle, as the subject of a patent, and a process by
which a principle is applied to effect a useful result. That a
hot-blast is better than a cold-blast for smelting iron in a
furnace was the principle or scientific fact discovered by
Neilson, and yet, being nothing but a principle, he could
not have a patent for that. But having invented and
practically exemplified a process for utilizing this principle,
namely, that of heating the blast, in a receptacle, between
the blowing apparatus and the furnace, he was entitled to a
patent for that process, although he did not distinctly point
out all the forms of apparatus by which the process might
be applied . . . .236
So the nineteenth-century Court regarded Neilson the same way it
had been regarded in England, as representing the dividing line between
unpatentable abstract principles and patentable applications.237 Yet there
requirement for creative application, it is difficult to see why trivial structural changes, not
involving invention, sufficed to render a new use patentable. See id. at 404–07; L. James Harris,
Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 658, 666 n.29 (1954–55) (noting that courts recognized inventions in the discovery of a
new use of an old composition even when the discovery involved a slight change).
229. See 102 U.S. 707, 722–26 (1880).
230. See id. at 719.
231. See 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 396 (1874).
232. See Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 729–30.
233. Id. at 722.
234. See id. at 725.
235. Id. at 723.
236. Id. at 724–25.
237. Id. at 724.
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was no suggestion at all that the application need be novel or inventive.
Indeed, in Mitchell, the Court invoked Househill for the proposition that
practical applications of a principle were patentable without any novel
means:
Doubtless, an invention may be good though the subject of
it consists in the discovery of some principle of science or
property of matter, never before known or used, by which
some new and useful result is obtained, and such an
invention or discovery may be the subject of a valid patent
without including in the claim any new arrangement of
machinery to accomplish the object, provided the inventor
describes, as required in the patent law, the method,
process, or means of applying the invention to practical use
and of obtaining the described new and useful result.238
Without belaboring the cases further, it is clear that for the nineteenthcentury Supreme Court, Neilson stood for three different propositions. First,
in general, Neilson and Househill defined the boundary between
unpatentable principle and patentable application, though none of the Court’s
cases actually turned on this distinction. Second, Neilson came to stand for
the proposition that while a process depended on physical instrumentalities,
the process might be patentable independent of the particular
instrumentalities employed by the inventor. 239 And third, a sufficiently
enabling specification would permit the patentee to claim well beyond
the particular embodiments that he disclosed. Neilson was certainly not
understood as restricting patentability to an inventive application, nor
mandating that abstract principles be treated as prior art.
Beyond the Supreme Court cases endorsing Neilson and Househill,
American case law was generally consistent with the notion that
fundamental principles were patent eligible if embodied in a practical
manufacture or process, with no requirement of novelty or invention in
the means of application. Thus in 1863, Justice Robert Grier referred to:
[T]hose inventions which consist in a new application of
certain natural forces to produce a certain result to which
they had never before been applied, and which, when once
pointed out, required no invention to construct devices for
its application. Such inventions partake of the nature of
discoveries, either found out by experiment or the result of
a happy thought, which, when once expressed, is plain to

238. Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 392 (1874) (citing Househill Coal &
Iron Co. v. Neilson, 1 Web. P. C. 673, 683 (1843)).
239. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 117 (1854) (explaining Neilson).
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all intelligent persons, who could point out at once many
devices for making it effectual.240
But in truth, the Supreme Court’s cases do little more than allude to
the theoretical distinction between unpatentable abstractions and
patentable applications. If Morse is viewed as an enablement case, then
none of the Court’s decisions actually address the boundary between
principle and patent.
B. Lower Courts in the Late Nineteenth Century
Beyond the Supreme Court, only a handful of decisions from the
lower courts addressed the boundary between discovery and invention
in the latter half of the century. The leading case was probably Morton
v. New York Eye Infirmary,241 an 1862 case decided by the Circuit Court
for the Southern District of New York. The case considered the
patentability of the use of ether as a surgical anesthetic. 242 Morton
acknowledged the significance of the inventor’s discovery; yet waxed
poetic about the unpatentability of the discoveries alone:
A discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not patentable.
No matter through what long, solitary vigils, or by what
importunate efforts, the secret may have been wrung from
the bosom of Nature, or to what useful purpose it may be
applied. . . . The new force or principle . . . can be patented
only in connection or combination with the means by
which, or the medium through which, it operates.243
So does Morton therefore stand for the proposition that discovery of
a new natural phenomenon is not patentable without an additional
inventive concept or principle in the application, as some commentators
have argued?244 Morton focuses primarily on the physical application of
the inventor’s discovery: the inventor must identify “some particular
medium or mechanical contrivance” through which the new principle
might act on the material world.245 Morton therefore presents more of a
demand for tangible application than for inventive application. Yet,
ultimately, the case does not appear to have been decided on either
ground. According to the court, it had been long known that inhalation
of ether vapors “produced an effect like that of intoxication,
240. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 568 (1864) (emphasis added). The hat-making
invention in Burr was not of this sort. See id. at 569.
241. 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865).
242. Id. at 882.
243. Id. at 884.
244. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 26, at 71 (stating that Morton requires “new and
additional principle to such mere application of a discovery”).
245. Morton, 17 F. Cas. at 881.
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exhilaration, and more or less stupefaction.” 246 There being no novel
step or apparatus, all the patentee claimed was the improved effect of
higher dosages, stating, “the specification presents nothing new except
the effect produced by well-known agents, administered in well-known
ways on well-known subjects. This new or additional effect . . . . is
simply produced by increasing the quantity of the vapor inhaled.”247
For the court, the patentee’s discovery reduced to the finding that an
increased quantity of ether yielded a “more perfect effect” than the
partial intoxication already known in the art. 248 The Morton court
seemingly decided the case, not on the grounds that the patentee had
failed to provide an inventive application of his discovery, but rather on
the grounds that his discovery itself was not particularly inventive.249
That was also the view of Morton later adopted by the Patent Office.250
While the development of a new or inventive instrumentality certainly
would have helped the patentee’s case, in the end a deficiency in the
discovery department doomed the patent in Morton.251
The case that came closest to addressing “principle” in the late
nineteenth century was Wall v. Leck,252 decided by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1895. Wall involved a previously known
process of fumigating plants with hydrogen cyanide as an insecticide.253
According to the patent, the patentees discovered that fumigation was more
effective against insects, and less toxic to plants if performed in the dark—
although apparently the only way to ensure sufficient darkness was to
fumigate at night.254 The Ninth Circuit regarded this as nothing more
than a naked principle.255 Unlike Neilson, who had described a means
for applying his principle, the patentees in Wall relied solely on
nature—in the form of night—to implement their invention:
246. Id. at 882.
247. Id. at 883.
248. Id. at 882.
249. See id. (stating that the effect of ether discovered “was produced by old agents,
operating by old means upon old subjects” and that the “mere discovery” was not patentable
notwithstanding its novelty and importance).
250. See Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107, 110 (Pat. & Tr. Office Bd. App.
1954) (stating that patent in Morton was invalidated because use of ether was known).
251. Morton was also subsequently read as casting doubt on the patentability of medical
treatments. Matthew D. Show, A Dreadful Prognosis: Patentability of Diagnostic and
Personalized Medical Procedures in the Wake of In re Bilski, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 301,
306 (2010). But the Morton court seemed to regard the invention as a potentially patentable
“improvement in the art of surgery.” See Morton, 17 F. Cas. at 882. See also Scherer, 103
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 110–11 (denying that Morton stood for unpatentability of medical or surgical
methods).
252. 66 F. 552 (9th Cir. 1895).
253. Id. at 555.
254. Id. at 554.
255. Id. at 555.
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They simply discovered a truth,—that the fumigation of the
trees and plants could be made more effective and
beneficial by using it in the old way, only at night, or in
cloudy days or foggy weather; at any time when the actinic
rays of light were absent by the natural condition of nature.
To have entitled them to a patent, they should have
followed up their valuable discovery by inventing some
new method by the application of which the deleterious
effect of the actinic rays of light could have been
avoided.256
Wall is the case perhaps most analogous to Mayo: the patentees, by
discovery of an ostensible natural law, better defined the conditions
under which an old process should be performed.257 Like Mayo, Wall
denied patentability to the performance of a prior art process under
optimized conditions, at least where those conditions were the result of
natural circumstances rather than human intervention.258
Yet in Wall, the primary fault of the patent was that it required no
artificial means to implement the claimed method.259 The inventors, in
their patent, referred to the use of coverings to exclude the light, but
stated their belief that such coverings would be futile in full daylight.260
The Ninth Circuit denied patentability not because the inventors’ means
of application was obvious, but rather because their patent did nothing
more than invoke a force of nature: “No natural function of the day or
of the night, of the sun or of the moon, is patentable.”261 If they had
invented “some new process, device, or apparatus” to exclude light, the
patentees would have “brought themselves within the principle
announced in the Neilson Case.”262 But because the patentees seem to
have ruled out the possibility that their process could be effectively

256. Id. at 556.
257. See id. at 555 (providing that appellants’ discovery, however important, was an
elaboration and improvement on “the old process of fumigating trees by means of an oiled tent
and hydrocyanic acid gas”).
258. Wall may in reality be an inherency case. One assumes that the old process must at
some point have been carried out at night or at least in cloudy weather. That suspicion is
highlighted by the Ninth Circuit’s rhetorical question at the end of the opinion: if it was
discovered that breathing night air was more healthful, then would the inventor be entitled to
“the exclusive use of the air at the beneficial hours of day, and invest him with the power and
authority, under the shield of the patent law, to enjoin each and every other individual from
utilizing the air”? Id. at 557. Obviously, a claim to the breathing of air at certain hours would
have been inherently anticipated.
259. Id.
260. U.S. Patent No. 445,342 col. 1. ll. 33–37 (filed Dec. 10, 1889).
261. Wall, 66 F. at 557.
262. See id. at 556.
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implemented by artificial means, the Ninth Circuit did not have
occasion to address whether those means need be inventive.263
C. Learned Treatises in the Nineteenth Century
When asking how the legal community defined the boundary
between discovery and invention in the nineteenth century, reported
cases can only represent the tip of the iceberg. One can glean at least
some sense of how the broader community regarded that boundary by
turning to the great treatises of the era, which remained major points of
reference for courts well into the twentieth century. How did the major
nineteenth-century commentators view Neilson? And how did those
authors understand the boundary between unpatentable principle and
patentable application?
In the mid-nineteenth century, George Ticknor Curtis’s treatise was
unquestionably the dominant work on patent law from the 1847
publication of its first edition, and for some time after the 1873
publication of its fourth and final edition.264 In his later editions, Curtis
devoted an entire chapter to the question of “Extent of Principle.”265 But
as his title suggests, Curtis’s main interest was not the distinction between
an unpatentable principle and a patentable invention, but the question of
scope: when was an implementation of the inventor’s principle by other
means an infringement of the patent? 266 Not recognizing Morse as an
enablement case hampered Curtis on this question; for Curtis, if the
patent disclosed a practical means of implementing a principle, then any
other implementations of the principle would infringe.267 Without sufficient
attention to the point highlighted by the Supreme Court in Morse—that
in Neilson the disclosure was sufficient for one of ordinary skill to
implement any heating means—Curtis had difficulty explaining why
Neilson was able to reach beyond his embodiment but Morse could not.268
263. See id. at 555 (“It is true that a mode was pointed out, but not approved, to so color the
tent or covering as to exclude the actinic rays of light; but they neither invented nor discovered
any process, texture, or coloring that would sufficiently accomplish that purpose.”).
264. See Oren Bracha, The Statute of Anne: An American Mythology, 47 HOUS. L. REV.
877, 913 (2010) (discussing the first edition of Curtis’s treatise and the influence it gained over
the proceeding years); Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for
Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 313 (referring to Curtis’s work as “the leading treatise on
patent law” in 1850); William C. Rooklidge & Stephen C. Jensen, Common Sense, Simplicity
and Experimental Use Negation of the Public Use and on Sale Bars to Patentability, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 11 n.40 (1995) (noting that Curtis was “the author of four editions of the
preeminent pre-1890 patent law treatise”).
265. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS, at v (4th ed. 1873).
266. See id. § 124, at 140–41; id. § 149, at 166.
267. See id. § 136, at 149–50.
268. See id. § 156, at 181–82 (“It is somewhat difficult to see that Neilson’s claim, as
allowed by the Court of Exchequer, was valid if Morse’s claim was void . . . .”).
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On the distinction between patentable principle and unpatentable
invention, however, Curtis clearly identified abstractness as the
boundary line. In his analysis of Neilson he stated, “[t]he principle
itself, which may be an element, or truth, or force in nature, when
abstracted from practical application, is not within the field of
invention, in the sense of the patent law.”269 But it was not necessary for
the means of application to be novel or inventive; it was merely
necessary that the instrumentalities had not been previously used in
application of the principle.270
Likewise, Curtis ultimately concluded from the American cases (such as
Morse and Morton) that abstractness was the test for patent eligibility.271 It
was only when a patentee “severe[d] the use of a motive-power or other
elemental agency from all conditions of its application”272 that the claim
became void. That, rather than the unpatentability of scientific
principles, was the lesson of Morse. In Curtis’s analysis, the Court’s
decision turned on the view that Morse’s eighth claim was nothing more
than an abstraction.273
Abstractness was also the boundary between principle and patent in
Merwin’s 1883 work. “Naked principles” such as newly discovered
laws of nature or properties of matter could not be the subject of
patents, though a method or process of applying the principle to
practical use could.274 But Merwin was quite emphatic in stating that
nothing unconventional or inventive was necessary in the application:
“[N]evertheless, the means by which the principle is applied may be
devoid of all invention, and such as any workman skilled in the art
wherein the application is made might supply, when the discovery is
told him.”275
According to Merwin, practical application, “though simple and
obvious,” would suffice to transform an abstract principle into a patenteligible invention.276 Neilson illustrated this view, for in the Court of
Exchequer’s ruling on the sufficiency of the specification, Merwin
found confirmation “that the application of the law discovered by
269. Id. § 141, at 156 (commenting on the Neilson cases).
270. See id. (“The means itself is in such cases new in its relation to the application of the
principle, whether it be in other relations and for other uses new or old.”).
271. See id. §§ 154–55, at 180.
272. Id. § 160, at 187.
273. See id. § 159, at 184–85 (“[I]n truth the decision turned entirely upon a view taken of
the general claim, which gave it an extent that divested it of all conditions and made it an
abstraction.”); id. § 155, at 180 (“The principal ground on which [Morse] was reached appears
to have been that the eighth claim of the patent was virtually a claim for an abstraction . . . .”).
274. MERWIN, supra note 191, at 4; see also id. at 532 (“[A] law of nature or a property of
matter, in the abstract, is clearly not an art.”).
275. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
276. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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[Neilson] did not require invention.” 277 Thus, Merwin regarded both
Neilson and Le Roy as cases in which the merit of the patent, as Lord
Justice Clerk Hope explained in Househill, lay not in the application but
in the discovery.278
William Robinson’s monumental treatise of 1890 brought some
much needed clarity to the subject of principle by differentiating
between the senses in which the term was used. Principles, in the sense
of laws of nature or properties of matter, were clearly not the subject of
patents.279 Regarded as the common property of mankind, fundamental
principles could not be appropriated to exclusive use; lacking this
attribute of property, they could not be the subject of patents.280 Nor
were natural forces themselves the product of “inventive skill”; though
humans might discover them, they were not products of the inventive
mind unless some human intervention turned them to new ends.281 And
perhaps most fundamentally, the natural force alone was not an
operative means; without application to some object, it remained
“practically a mere abstraction.” 282 That an unapplied natural force
could not be patented was an ineluctable consequence of Robinson’s
theory of invention. In Robinson’s view, the true subject of patents was
the inventor’s “idea of means.”283 An abstract natural principle was not
an idea of means. 284 But in the sense that principle referred to the
inventor’s idea of means, an inventor could patent his principle, for in
Robinson’s view every thing or process that employed the inventor’s
idea of means was an infringement of his patent.285
For Robinson, the mental part of the inventive act necessarily
comprised both “discovery” and “construction.” 286 Discovery required
the inventor to uncover some quality in a force, an object, or a mode of
277. Id. at 6.
278. See id. at 5. Merwin actually divided patents into two categories: “inventions,” for
which a creative mental process was required, and “discoveries,” i.e., newly discovered
principles, for which no inquiry into the inventor’s mental process was necessary. See id. at 3.
279. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 135, at
194–95 (1890).
280. See id. § 137, at 196.
281. See id. § 136, at 195–96.
282. Id. § 138, at 197–98; see also id. § 143 n.1, at 203; Robinson quotes Lord Justice
Clerk Hope’s instructions in Househill at length, and regards him as having denied the
patentability of principles not on the ground that principles are laws of nature, but on the ground
that a principle is “abstract and incapable of producing practical results.” Robinson thought Lord
Justice Clerk Hope’s discussion explained the correct doctrine of principle “in the clearest
light.” Id. § 143 n.2, at 208.
283. See id. § 141, at 201.
284. See id. § 140, at 200.
285. See id. § 141, at 201–02.
286. See id. § 96, at 142. Construction was a mental act, distinct from reduction to practice.
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application that made their union possible,287 while construction consisted of
combining the three into an operative means. Although this conception
of construction was essential to the mental part of the inventive act,288
for Robinson only discovery involved the exercise of the inventive
faculties. 289 By definition, Robinson’s theory of invention embraced
inventive discovery rather than inventive application. Although the
naked discovery of a new quality in a known substance did not
constitute invention, 290 the discovery of new qualities in a known
substance, made available for practical use by means of well-known
forces and well-known methods, yielded patentable invention.291
Thus, Robinson viewed Neilson’s true invention as the discovery
that materials in a blast furnace were susceptible to the action of hot
air.292 Having discovered this susceptibility, Neilson’s invention was, in
fact, the treatment of those materials with hot air rather than cold.293
Whether his means of heating were novel was immaterial to Robinson:
“If his method of heating the air had been previously employed, as, for
instance, to warm buildings or dry clothes, would the merit or
originality or patentability of his invention have been any less . . . ?”294
Patentable invention could therefore reside in the discovery of a new
property of matter, which, once discovered, immediately suggested the
use of well-known and conventional instrumentalities to achieve
practical results.
In sum, examination of the nineteenth-century cases and
authorities295 demonstrates the following state of affairs at the end of the
287. See id. In Robinson’s complex theory of “idea of means,” every invention consisted of
the union of an object, a force, and a mode by which the force was applied to the object. See id.
§ 91, at 138. This definition was said to emerge from “[a] moment’s reflection.” Id. The major
irony of Robinson’s work is that the “idea of means” was the heart of his system; the
unworkability of his definition destined it to obscurity even as his treatise became authoritative.
288. See id. § 100 n.1, at 146.
289. See id. § 96, at 142.
290. See id. § 100, at 146. Robinson regarded the lower court’s decision in Ansonia Brass
as an example; the Supreme Court had not yet heard the case when Robinson wrote. See id.
§ 100 n.1, at 146 (citing Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply Co., 32 F. 81 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1887), aff’d, 144 U.S. 11 (1892)).
291. See id. § 101 n.2, at 147.
292. See id. § 143 n.2, at 204–05.
293. See id.
294. Id. § 143 n.2, at 205. Robinson was thus taking the sensible view that the superiority
of hot air to cold in the artificial environment of a blast furnace was hardly a “law of nature.”
295. Albert Walker’s treatise, which became more or less authoritative by default as the
only one continually updated in the twentieth century, has very little to say on the subject.
Walker does not address the English precedent at all, and his analysis of the “laws of nature”
problem beyond summarizing the cases is minimal. In Walker’s view, the distinction between
Morse’s invalid claim and the valid claims of Tilghman, Bell, and others was that Morse had
claimed a process utilizing only a single law of nature; those patents approved by the Supreme
Court instead utilized several laws of nature in a particular order and method. ALBERT H.
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century. Neither courts nor scholars understood Neilson to demand prior
art treatment of fundamental principles, nor to require invention in the
application of discoveries. Principles, such as scientific discoveries or laws
of nature, were unpatentable because they were mere abstractions. 296
Following Curtis’s treatment, Morse was usually regarded as a case about
the unpatentability of abstractions, not about laws of nature per se.297 But
once embodied in a practical application—whether device or process—
principles became patentable, although the question of patent scope
remained a difficult one. Patentable novelty and invention could arise
from the underlying discovery, rather than the application itself.
IV. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY BEFORE FUNK BROTHERS
For the first half of the twentieth century, the consensus Neilson
established—that the boundary of the patent system lay between abstract
principles and practical application—went nearly undisturbed. Until the
Supreme Court decided Funk Brothers in 1948, American patent law
did not impose a requirement of inventive application as a matter of
subject-matter eligibility. This Part again examines the course of the
eligibility doctrine in the decisions of the Supreme Court, the lower
courts, and commentators both within and without the patent system.
A. The Supreme Court in the Early Twentieth Century
As was true in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court’s few
early twentieth-century cases did not address the boundary between
discovery and invention directly. In 1931, the Court acknowledged the
unpatentability of pure “scientific explanation” in De Forest Radio Co.
v. General Electric Co.298 Yet the Court’s analysis in De Forest Radio
does not suggest a test of inventive application. Rather, it seems to
endorse the view that scientific discovery alone might supply the
creativity needed for patentability.
The issue in De Forest Radio was the patentability of Langmuir’s
high-vacuum triode tube over prior low-vacuum triodes, principally Lee

WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 13 (2d ed.
1889).
296. See, e.g., William B. Whitney, Patentable Processes, 19 HARV. L. REV. 30, 41 (1905)
(noting that a function of a machine is not patentable as “mere abstraction”).
297. See id. at 37–38 (“[Morse] made his claim to an art or principle in the abstract—to the
use of a power of nature to perform an abstract function or effect an abstract result, regardless of
the particular process or apparatus employed . . . .”); see also Edward A. Ruestow, Principles
and Products of Nature Rule as Patentable Subject Matter, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86, 87–88
(1940) (characterizing Morse and subsequent cases as excluding from patentability “the
intangibles of the invention—the bare principle of operation itself”).
298. 283 U.S. 664, 684–85 (1931), amended by 284 U.S. 571 (1931) (per curiam).
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de Forest’s Audion. 299 De Forest had erroneously believed that the
residual ionized gas in the low-vacuum tube served as the conductor for
the triode current. 300 Irving Langmuir, however, had determined that
thermionic emission operated by “pure electron discharge”—the direct
emission of electrons from the cathode—which meant that residual gas
was not necessary for operation of the vacuum tube.301 The ionized gas
present in the low-vacuum tube caused operational instability and
disintegration of the cathode; Langmuir’s high-vacuum tube was free of
these drawbacks and replaced the Audion for essentially all
applications.302
The Court determined that if “the relationship of the degree of vacuum
within the tube, to ionization” was known, “it required no inventive genius
to avoid ionization and secure the desired result by creating the vacuum in
a De Forest tube or other form of low vacuum discharge device.”303 If
inventive application had been the test of patentability, then the Court’s
analysis ought to have ended there: given the discovery that emission of
electrons from a cathode was an inherent property of the metal, and not
of a gaseous carrier, the application in the form of a high-vacuum tube
was conventional and obvious.304 But the Court’s analysis did not end
there. The Court went on to state that “[e]ven . . . so simple a change in
structure as could be brought about by reducing the pressure in the well
known low vacuum tube by a few microns” might be “invention” if the
relationship between vacuum and ionization had not been known. 305
The Court then reviewed in detail Edgar Lilienfeld’s prior work in the
field, concluding that Lilienfeld had already described the space charge
effect, the independence of discharge from gas density below a certain
threshold, and the 3/2 power relationship between current and voltage
299. See id. at 664–86.
300. See id. at 682–84.
301. See Irving Langmuir, The Pure Electron Discharge and Its Applications in Radio
Telegraphy and Telephony, 3 PROC. IRE 261 (1915), reprinted in 85 PROC. IEEE 1496, 1499
(1997).
302. See id. at 1499–1500, 1502.
303. De Forest Radio, 283 U.S. at 678–79.
304. See id. at 681–82 (noting the application of the relationship between discharge and
reduced pressure in the form of high vacuum involved only skill in the art, not “inventive
faculty”). One could reconcile De Forest Radio with a requirement for inventive application on
the grounds that pure electron discharge in a vacuum tube is not a law of nature or natural
phenomenon. Without belaboring the obvious criticism that arbitrary definition of fundamental
principles is a major problem in the Court’s recent § 101 jurisprudence, I will merely note that
the relationship between vacuum and ionization seems no less of a natural law than the
relationship between dosage of a thiopurine drug and therapeutic effectiveness deemed a natural
law in Mayo.
305. Id. at 678 (stating that there was a question of fact as to whether the relationship
between the degree of vacuum and ionization was known to the art at the time of Langmuir’s
invention).
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that Langmuir described as all characteristic of pure electron discharge
in his patent.306
If the Court had treated the underlying relationship between degree
of vacuum and ionization as part of the prior art de jure, as in Flook,
then of course it would not have needed to determine whether the
relationship was in fact part of the prior art. But given that Lilienfeld had
already described the phenomenon of electron discharge in a high vacuum,
the Court held that Langmuir could not claim invention based on “the
discovery of the principle” that electron discharge above the ionization
voltage was possible with sufficiently high vacuum.307 Langmuir’s patent
was invalid because, though he may have been the first to explain the
physics of electron discharge in a high vacuum, he was not the first to
discover it.308 Nowhere did the Court hint that, if Langmuir had been the
first to discover the phenomenon, he still would have been denied the
patent.
In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,309
decided in 1939, the Court distinguished between an unpatentable
scientific or mathematical truth and a potentially patentable “novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth.”310
Along with Neilson and Funk Brothers, that language from Mackay
Radio provided the basis for Flook’s treatment of fundamental
principles as “familiar part[s] of the prior art.”311
Yet like De Forest Radio, Mackay Radio lends more support to the
patentability of simple applications of natural laws than it lends to the
contrary. The patent in Mackay Radio claimed the design of a standing
wave antenna whose dimensions were determined by a mathematical
formula disclosed in the patent.312 According to the Court, the claimed
antenna design formula was based on an old scientific discovery, but the
Court assumed that the patentee’s application was patentable “even though
it was achieved by the logical application of a known scientific law to a
familiar type of antenna.”313 The issue in the case was infringement.314
Because the defendant’s antennas did not conform to the known
scientific law disclosed in the patent, the patentee had attempted to
306. Id. at 679–80.
307. See id. at 680.
308. See id. at 684–85 (“It is the method and device which may be patented and not the
scientific explanation of their operation.”).
309. 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
310. Id. at 94.
311. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978) (citing Mackay Radio and Funk
Brothers).
312. Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 91–92.
313. Id. at 94.
314. Id. at 88.
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extend the claims beyond the mathematical relationship disclosed in the
patent.315 The patentee’s problem, according to the Court, was that he
had not discovered any new scientific principle that would support
broader claims:
[Patentee] Carter’s empirical formula, wholly derived from
Abraham’s formula, and taken together with it, therefore
discloses no invention or discovery more than the
application of the Abraham formula to the V antenna. It
reveals no scientific law applicable to wire lengths which
are intermediate of multiples of half wave lengths . . . .316
Thus to the extent it addressed the issue at all, Mackay Radio seems to
suggest the patentability of straightforward applications of scientific
principles rather than deny it.317
B. The Lower Courts in the Early Twentieth Century
At the lower courts, the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter
restricted patents in two primary areas: claims involving mental steps or
processes, and claims to purified natural products. The prohibition
against mental processes was probably more significant in practice. 318
Patents held invalid as “mental processes” included: systems of devising
coded messages;319 systems for preventing fraud;320 a method of producing
an aesthetic combination of color and sound;321 and methods for transacting
business, playing games, solving problems, and even training animals,
among a variety of others.322 The “printed matter” or “symbolic matter”

315. Id. at 99.
316. Id. at 98.
317. See id. at 100 (“This use of the empirical formula for a purpose for which it was not
devised does not justify our construing the application as though all reference to the Abraham
formula had been eliminated and a new and different one expressing a new and different
scientific law had been substituted for it.”).
318. For discussion of the “mental steps” doctrine, see generally Kevin Emerson Collins,
Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 391, 393 (2012).
319. Berardini v. Tocci, 190 F. 329, 333 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 200 F. 1021 (2d Cir.
1912).
320. Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 472 (2d Cir. 1908) (referring to
bookkeeping, cash registering, and account-checking systems).
321. Greenewalt v. Stanley Co. of Am., 54 F.2d 195, 196 (3d Cir. 1931).
322. CHARLES W. RIVISE & A.D. CAESAR, PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY § 20, at 35
(1936). For further discussion and summary, see 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 1.03[6][a] (2014); see also In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 383 (C.C.P.A. 1951). But see
In re Sheffield, 288 F. 463 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the patentee’s claim to a “method of
visually indicating the structure and meaning of a sentence” was patentable). Charles Rivise and
A.D. Caesar viewed some cases, including the Telephone Cases, as upholding the patentability
of mental steps. See RIVISE & CAESAR, supra, § 21.
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cases might be classified as mental processes as well.323 The exclusion
of these categories from the patent system was generally regarded as sui
generis, and not an aspect of the exclusion of abstract ideas or other
fundamental discoveries.324
On the question of patentability of natural products purified from
nature, the leading authorities supporting the patentability of natural
products were the aspirin case,325 and Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.,326 upholding the validity of a
claim to adrenalin purified from natural sources. 327 Chiefly opposed
were the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s decision in
General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co.328—denying patentability
to purified tungsten 329 —and the Marden cases from the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), which followed General Electric
in denying claims to purified vanadium and uranium.330 However, by
1939, the CCPA seemed to have settled on the position that products
purified from nature were patentable if (and only if) the purified form
had utility not possessed by the natural source.331
The interesting aspect of General Electric and the Marden cases is
that in these cases the inventors also included claims to novel and useful
structures made from then newly available metals—in General Electric,
wires formed of ductile tungsten (immediately useful for light bulbs and
323. See, e.g., Latz v. Reliance Graphic Corp., 98 F.2d 679, 679 (2d Cir. 1938) (finding a
blank form not patent eligible); id. at 680–81 (discussing cases analogous to, and distinguishable
from, Latz); Wier v. Coe, 33 F. Supp. 142, 143 (D.D.C. 1940) (finding claim to form for printed
music not patentable), aff’d, 122 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (per curiam); see also EUSTACE
STRAUGHN GLASCOCK & EMERSON STRINGHAM, PATENT LAW: SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS §§ 1210,
1212, 1214, 1216, 1218 (1943) (demonstrating the dubious patentability of printed or symbolic
matter in case law); Morton C. Jacobs, Editorial Note, The Patentability of Printed Matter:
Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475 (1949–50) (discussing printed matter cases).
But see Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443, 446–47 (6th Cir. 1913) (finding a printed
transfer ticket patentable “manufacture”).
324. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 318, at 392–93 (“A method claim reciting a mental
process was not categorically excluded from patentable subject matter. Rather, it was beyond
patentable subject matter only if a mental-process limitation was the claim’s sole point of
novelty.”).
325. Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1910)
(affirming patentability of purified aspirin).
326. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
327. See id. at 97, 102.
328. 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928).
329. Id. at 642–43.
330. In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931); In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958, 959–60
(C.C.P.A. 1931).
331. See In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (explaining that while purification
of a natural product did not ordinarily confer patentability, new utility of the purified substance
might confer patentability); see also In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 620 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (same); In
re Macallum, 102 F.2d 614, 616 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (same).
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vacuum tubes), 332 and in the Marden cases, wires and filaments of
vanadium or uranium.333
In General Electric, the Third Circuit conceded that the wires were
new and useful creations of the inventor because it was impossible to
draw wires from the brittle form of tungsten known in the prior art.334
But considering whether there was “invention” in the inventor’s
creation of drawn tungsten wire, the General Electric court stated:
Given the knowledge of the art and particularly the
disclosures of [scientists] Just and Hanaman as to the
advantages of a tungsten filament and given pure tungsten
with its natural characteristics of great ductility and high
tensile strength, the drawing of such tungsten into a wire
for filament purposes was obvious.335
In other words, although the discovery of pure ductile tungsten
represented a great advance in the art, if that discovery was treated as
prior art, then the manufacture of a wire was obvious.336 Over a dissent
by Judge Joseph Buffington, 337 the Third Circuit held the claims to
tungsten wires invalid.338 Likewise in the Marden cases, the CCPA, on
the authority of General Electric, held invalid not only claims to ductile
uranium and vanadium, but also to wires and filaments composed of the
new ductile forms.339
The General Electric court reached this conclusion in part because
the utility of a drawn tungsten wire was recognized long before the
inventor made the wire.340 The court therefore regarded the inventor as
having created a process for producing ductile tungsten but not the idea
of a tungsten wire: “In other words, the idea of ‘tungsten wire’ ran
ahead of the production of ductile tungsten so that when ductile
tungsten was finally produced the drawing of it into wire was a thing
long intended and therefore obvious.”341
Unlike cases such as Neilson, where the application could not have
been conceived prior to the inventor’s discovery, in General Electric the
332. Gen. Elec., 28 F.2d at 641, 643.
333. In re Marden, 47 F.2d at 957; In re Marden, 47 F.2d at 958.
334. 28 F.2d at 642, 644.
335. Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
336. See id. (noting that the art was at a “standstill” before the inventor’s discovery, but
concluding that the advancement was obvious).
337. Id. at 648 (Buffington, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 644 (majority opinion).
339. In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931); In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958, 959
(C.C.P.A. 1931).
340. See Gen. Elec., 28 F.2d at 644 (stating that history of attempts to produce drawn
tungsten wire fortified the court’s conclusion). Perhaps ironically by modern standards, the
long-felt need and the failure of others reinforced the conclusion of obviousness.
341. Id.
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desired application had long existed and was simply awaiting the
enabling discovery. It was not a case where “inventiveness” could have
been supplied by an inventive discovery. However, whether or not
General Electric implied a requirement of inventive application, that
aspect of the case appears to have been forgotten. Subsequent decisions
still cited General Electric for the proposition that natural products were
not patentable,342 but no decision beyond the Marden cases seems to
have relied on the holding regarding wire, or pursued the reasoning that
an invention enabled by a new discovery is unpatentable because it was
long envisioned.343
But beyond the categories of mental processes and natural products,
lower courts in the first half of the twentieth century recognized few
limits on the scope of patent-eligible subject matter other than the longstanding restriction of the patent system to the technological arts. Courts
continued to declare the unpatentability of principles and ideas in the
abstract,344 and one might regard some of the mental process cases as
examples of this exclusion. But aside from the mental process cases, no
decisions in the first half of the twentieth century actually invalidated
claims as drawn to principles or discoveries in the abstract.345 The trend
of the case law actually ran in the opposite direction.
342. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir.
1958); Merck & Co. v. Chase Chem. Co., 273 F. Supp. 68, 82 (D.N.J. 1967).
343. This aspect of General Electric and the Marden cases is no longer viable after Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad—at least as a question of patent-eligible subject matter. See
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (holding “that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a
product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is
patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring”). Certainly the “idea” of BRCA cDNAs well
proceeded their isolation, and once the BRCA sequence was known, the creation of a cDNA
would be “a thing long intended and therefore obvious.” Compare Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2113–
14 (stating that “isolation is necessary to conduct genetic testing, and Myriad was not the only
entity to offer BRCA testing after it discovered the genes”), with Gen. Elec., 28 F.2d at 644
(“[T]he idea of ‘tungsten wire’ ran ahead of the production of ductile tungsten so that when
ductile tungsten was finally produced the drawing of it into wire was a thing long intended and
therefore obvious.”). Yet the Supreme Court confirmed the patent eligibility of BRCA cDNAs in
Myriad. 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
344. See, e.g., Ind. & Ill. Coal Corp. v. Clarkson, 91 F.2d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1937) (“A
mere idea, of course, is not patentable.”); Buck v. Ooms, 63 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D.D.C. 1945)
(“It must be borne in mind, however, that patents are not granted on discoveries of abstract laws
or principles.”).
345. Only three twentieth-century cases were classified as “abstract principle” cases by
Rivise and Caesar (writing in 1936). See RIVISE & CAESAR, supra note 322, § 31. Two were
cases where the invention was disclosed or suggested by the prior art, the patentee having only
discovered an inherent property or explanation of the prior art: American Mercerizing Co. v.
Hampton Co., 147 F. 725, 725, 731 (D. Mass. 1906) (involving a claim to the discovery that
tension created silky luster in the mercerizing process), and De Forest Radio Co. v. General
Electric Co., 283 U.S. 664, 676 (1931) (finding that the desirability of high vacuum was
suggested in prior art), amended by 284 U.S. 571 (1931) (per curiam). The third, Ex parte Mills,
denied patentability to fibrogen, said to be a protein-phospholipin compound newly isolated
from natural sources. 1928 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 4, 5.
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The 1908 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs346
led that trend. The inventors in Cameron developed a new method of
sewage treatment—letting raw sewage incubate undisturbed in a tank
before exposing it to air and light. 347 This process permitted the
successive and separate action of both anaerobic and aerobic bacteria to
break down the waste.348 There was nothing new about the tank. Both
the trial court and the Second Circuit regarded the patentee’s apparatus
as old and the claims drawn to the apparatus as invalid. 349 The trial
court also found little novelty in the steps of the process.350 Given that
the apparatus and basic steps were known in the art, the trial court
regarded the growth of the bacteria as merely a natural process, a
principle unpatentable under Le Roy and Morse. 351 The trial court’s
discussion, wavering between lack of novelty in the means, the
unpatentability of a principle, and the lack of human intervention in the
process of bacterial growth, is difficult to pin down doctrinally. Yet
even assuming the patentee was the first to discover that undisturbed
bacteria would form a scum over the sewage, fostering anaerobic
conditions, the district court regarded that discovery as nothing more
than a principle.352
The Second Circuit disagreed. Most of its opinion addressed
differences between conditions in the prior art and the claimed process
that the trial court had overlooked.353 But the court also rejected the trial
court’s conclusion that the claims covered a process of nature. 354
According to the court, the inventor was the first to provide conditions
that amplified the bacteria’s natural capacity for the effective disposal
of sewage.355 In the court’s view, “[t]his certainly involved ‘the use of
one of the agencies of nature for a practical purpose.’ The process is one
which puts a force of nature into a certain specified condition and then
uses it in that condition for a practical purpose.”356
346. 159 F. 453 (2d Cir. 1908).
347. See id. at 453–54.
348. Id. at 455.
349. See id. at 463–64.
350. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 151 F. 242, 260
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1907), rev’d, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir. 1908).
351. See id. at 260–61.
352. See id. at 262.
353. See, e.g., Cameron, 159 F. at 450.
354. See id. at 462–63.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 463 (citation omitted) (quoting Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart,
158 U.S. 68, 77 (1895)). Cameron might stand for nothing more than a rejection of Wall v. Leck,
66 F. 552 (9th Cir. 1895). Whereas Wall had denied patentability to a process employing natural
darkness, 66 F. at 557, Cameron endorsed a process employing natural bacterial action, 159 F.
at 462–63. In both cases the patentee had used old means to provide suitable conditions.
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The same distinction—between natural phenomena in the abstract
and practical application—undergirded Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin
Laboratories, 357 decided in 1930 by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Dick is usually remembered today as a
case supporting the patentability of medical and diagnostic methods.358
But more so than the inventions in other early twentieth-century cases,
basic scientific discovery was the foundation of the invention in Dick.
The inventors in that case—University of Chicago researchers—
discovered that a toxin secreted by hemolytic streptococci caused scarlet
fever.359 The purification of the scarlet fever toxin quickly led to the
claimed inventions: processes for administering the toxin to humans for
diagnostic tests and immunization, and administration to animals for the
production of an antitoxin.360 Claims to the purified toxin appeared in
the patent as well.361
On a suit under the patent,362 the district court regarded the discovery
of the true cause of scarlet fever—the soluble toxin—as the key to the
invention.363 The court recognized that no patent could be granted for a
discovery or law of nature.364 Invention required “an operable means or
method” to achieve a practical result.365 But the application claimed in
Dick—administering the toxin to humans or animals—was apparently
routine in the art:
Having determined what the cause [of scarlet fever]
was, then, by the application of what was already known in
the art, the processes could be devised.
Or, to put it [a] different way, when the experimental
form of the processes had been employed to the point when

Cameron thus stood for the patentability of methods depending on principles of nature for their
action. Yet if one regards the action of anaerobic bacteria in sewage as a law of nature, there
was certainly nothing inventive about the patentee’s application. The problem, obviously, is
how to identify the law of nature operative in a claim.
357. 43 F.2d 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
358. See, e.g., Show, supra note 251, at 307.
359. See Dick, 43 F.2d at 633.
360. See id. at 630.
361. Claim 8 recited “[a] sterile toxin specific to scarlet fever.” U.S. Patent No. 1,547,369
(filed Nov. 28, 1924) (issued July 28, 1925). Claim 9 added the limitation that the toxin be
obtained from a pure culture of scarlet fever streptococci. Id.
362. The inventors had assigned the patents to the “Scarlet Fever Committee.” See Dick, 43
F.2d at 638.
363. See id. at 630.
364. Id. at 631.
365. See id. at 630 (distinguishing the skin test claim at issue in Dick from invalid claims in
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 119–20 (1853), and Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17
F. Cas. 879, 881–82 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)).
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it had been proved what was the cause of the disease,
thereupon they became an invention.366
Other sources corroborate the view that there seemed little (if any)
inventiveness in culturing the bacteria or in producing the toxin and
antitoxin. 367 The court nonetheless validated the claims. 368 Dick is a
brief opinion, possibly delivered from the bench, 369 and there is no
appellate opinion in the case. Dick nonetheless clearly set the dividing
line between discovery and invention at practical application, not the
addition of a further inventive concept.
Similar to Dick—but even more similar to Funk Brothers—was
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents, 370 which concerned Chaim
Weizmann’s patent for the production of acetone by bacterial
fermentation. 371 Acetone had been produced (inefficiently) by bacterial
fermentation before,372 and there appeared to be nothing novel or inventive
about Weizmann’s fermentation process. In litigation on the English
counterpart patent, Weizmann’s attorneys even admitted that his
fermentation process, aside from the bacteria involved, was identical to
processes of the prior art.373 The only apparent novelty or invention was
the new bacteria Weizmann had isolated from nature. 374 Thus, while
Weizmann had claimed the fermentation process rather than the bacteria
per se, the only “inventive genius” exercised was in the discovery and
isolation of a natural phenomenon.375 The application consisted solely
of employing the new bacteria according to old and known techniques.

366. See id. at 631.
367. See, e.g., Editorial, Ethics and Patents, 16 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 919, 919 (1926)
(“There does not appear to be anything strictly original in the method of growing the germ or
the production of the serum . . . .”).
368. Dick, 43 F.2d at 639. Most of the opinion is devoted to the question of invention. The
defendants argued separately that the skin test claim did not define a “process.” See id. at 630.
369. See id. at 629 (noting that Judge Francis Caffey did not have enough time to fully
prepare due to his caseload).
370. 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931), aff’d, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932) (per curiam).
371. Id. at 401. The production of acetone was important during World War I as a solvent
for the manufacture of nitrocellulose-based explosives. See id.; H.E. Hall, Solvents Produced by
Bacteria, 29 CHEMICAL AGE 103, 103 (1921).
372. See Guaranty Trust, 54 F.2d at 403.
373. See Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Synthetic Prods. Co., 43 R.P.C. 185, 199 (High Ct.
Ch. 1926) (patentee’s argument) (“If Weizmann’s bacillus were the same as that indicated in
Fernbach and Strange, then the two processes would be the same.”). The patent referred to by
Weizmann’s attorneys was the Fernbach and Strange patent, No. 21,073 of 1912. See id.
374. See Guaranty Trust, 54 F.2d at 403 (“The problem with which he was dealing and
successfully solved was that of isolating a particular bacteria or a culture containing some
particular bacteria that would produce butyl alcohol and acetone in commercial quantities better
than any other known bacteria.”).
375. See id.
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Yet the courts upheld the validity of the patent against the charge that it
was for a phenomenon or process of nature.376
The last “natural law” controversy before Funk Brothers arose in
connection with Harry Steenbock’s vitamin D patents. Steenbock
discovered that exposing foods to ultraviolet radiation increased their
vitamin D content.377 The process, applied to cereals, milk, and medicinal
preparations, led to the near eradication of rickets.378 The patents also
led to the establishment of the first university technology transfer
organization, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF).379
Process claims in the Steenbock patents recited the step of subjecting
foodstuff to ultraviolet rays “such as are produced by a quartz mercury
vapour lamp.”380 When WARF asserted the Steenbock patents in 1941,
the defendant argued, among other defenses, that the process claims
were drawn to nothing more than a process or law of nature. 381 The
defendants based their argument on Wall v. Leck: just as the natural
action of darkness was not patentable in Wall, the action of ultraviolet
light—which might originate from the sun as well as an artificial
source—should not be patentable.382
The district court viewed the claims in suit as limited to the use of
artificial light produced by ultraviolet lamps. 383 Because the patentee
used lamps as the source of ultraviolet, the district court rejected the
defense:
The principle of law is settled that if one has gone beyond
the domains of discovery and laid hold of a new force and
connected it with some mechanical contrivance through
which it acts, he is entitled to secure control of it, for the
existence in nature of a force that can be and is used by
man does not argue against invention unless the invention
consists simply in adopting what nature, unaided, gave. It is
the use that is patentable, the utilizing of a law of nature by
means of a method.384
376. The defendant argued that the patent was invalid because it attempted to patent “the
life process of a living organism.” Id. at 410. The district court allowed that a claim to the
bacteria per se might pose issues, but regarded the defendant’s argument foreclosed by Cameron
and Dick. See id. On appeal, the Third Circuit, per curiam, affirmed the validity of the patent, on
“the careful and comprehensive opinion of the learned District Judge.” Union Solvents Corp. v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 61 F.2d 1041, 1041 (3d Cir. 1932) (per curiam).
377. Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Vitamin Technologists, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 857, 861
(S.D. Cal. 1941), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944).
378. See id.
379. See History, WARF, http://www.warf.org/about-us/background/history/history.cmsx
(last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
380. U.S. Patent No. 1,680,818, Claim 1 (filed June 30, 1924) (issued Aug. 14, 1928).
381. See Wis. Alumni Research, 41 F. Supp. at 864.
382. See id. at 865.
383. Id. at 864–65.
384. Id. at 865.
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There was certainly nothing inventive about the patentee’s means;
ultraviolet lamps were old and well known. The district court accepted
that under Wall v. Leck, patentable invention lay only in the exercise of
“inventive skill” or “creative genius,” not the discovery of natural
laws. 385 Yet the use of an ultraviolet lamp sufficed. So long as the
patentee followed up on his discovery by employing some artificial
means, the resulting method was patentable.386
When the appeal came before the Ninth Circuit in 1944, the court
proved remarkably hostile to the Steenbock patents. It construed the
limitation “ultra-violet rays, such as are produced by a quartz mercury
vapour lamp” to encompass the natural ultraviolet rays of the sun.387
Hence, the process claims were inherently anticipated by the ancient
practice of drying foods in sunlight.388 The court invalidated the process
claims, as well as the claims of another patent directed to medicinal
preparations, as indefinite for failing to specify the degree of ultraviolet
irradiation.389 In addition, a patent directed to the treatment of yeast was
“invalid” on account of laches.390 The Ninth Circuit also regarded WARF’s
restrictive licensing as against public policy because it withheld the simple
cure for rickets from the poor (who were most afflicted),391 and the court
urged the U.S. Attorney General to investigate the patentee for patent
misuse.392
The only thing favorable the Ninth Circuit had to say regarding the
patents was that they were not monopolies on a law of nature. Though
the court had construed the process claims to include irradiation by the
sun, the court emphasized that the use of ultraviolet rays was “part of a
process which comprises the preparation of food substances.”393 Hence,
the claims no more monopolized the power of the sun than machines
operating by gravity monopolized the gravitational force of the earth.394
If the claims encompassed exposing food to natural ultraviolet light,
then it seems difficult to distinguish between night as a source of
darkness in Wall with the sun as a source of ultraviolet light in Vitamin
Technologies. In Wall, patentees claimed natural darkness as part of a
process for the fumigation of plants. Yet the Ninth Circuit summarily

385. See id. at 865–66.
386. See id. at 866.
387. Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 947–48
(9th Cir. 1944).
388. Id. at 949.
389. See id. at 951.
390. Id. at 951–52.
391. Id. at 945.
392. See id. at 946.
393. Id. at 949.
394. Id.
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dismissed its prior decision in Wall v. Leck as irrelevant.395 Certainly
there was no pretense in the case that Steenbock’s means of irradiation
was inventive: once the natural phenomenon of the activation of vitamin
D by ultraviolet light was discovered, Steenbock’s application of his
discovery was entirely conventional and obvious. Given the Ninth
Circuit’s hostility towards the Steenbock patents, one assumes that if
some notion of inventive application had been current in the patent law
of the time, the court would not have been so quick to reject the “law of
nature” argument.396
C. Commentary in the Early Twentieth Century
Treatise writers of the early twentieth century, like their nineteenthcentury counterparts, continued to maintain that practical application
sufficed to transform a principle into a patentable invention.
Inventiveness or ingenuity in the application was unnecessary. For
example, Rivise and Caesar’s 1936 treatise summarized the case law
thus:
In all of the decided cases, the Courts have taken great
pains to point out the fact that though neither the cause nor
its effect is patentable by itself, the means by which the
cause is applied to produce the effect is patentable. . . . In
other words, the principle of nature itself is not patentable,
but its utilization by means of an art, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter, when properly expressed in one
of these forms, is patentable.
....
In the cases where the inventor was required to be also
the discoverer of the law or force utilized, it appeared that
the application or utilization of the law became self-evident
as soon as the principle was formulated.397
395. See id. (rejecting appellant’s argument based on Wall v. Leck).
396. Judge William Healy authored a somewhat ambiguous concurrence in the case. He
began by stating that the claims should be regarded as anticipated by the prior use of natural
sunlight, rather than as the attempted monopoly on the use of sunlight. See id. at 953 (Healy, J.,
concurring). But he also stated that if Steenbock’s real invention had been to determine the most
effective degree of ultraviolet exposure, then “[i]t would amount to no more than the
ascertainment of a naked fact or principle in nature existing independently of the efforts of the
discoverer.” Id. at 954. If he meant that the discovery of optimal conditions for a prior art
process should be regarded as a naked principle, then his reasoning is reminiscent of Mayo. But
it is not clear if that was Healy’s meaning; he next stated that if such discovery were patentable,
it would be “broader than the process itself” in that it would include all processes with the same
effect, including exposure of foodstuffs to the sun. Id.
397. RIVISE & CAESAR, supra note 322, §§ 33–34 (emphasis added); see also GLASCOCK &
STRINGHAM, supra note 323, § 1170 (listing and expounding on cases falling under the
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Those outside the legal community also saw practical application as
the boundary between invention and discovery. In 1934, a committee of
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
produced a report, The Protection by Patents of Scientific Discoveries,
that evaluated both the current state of patent protection, and the
possibility of a sui generis regime for the protection of scientific
property. 398 The report described the current scope of patent-eligible
subject matter:
[N]early all the results of research which have some
practical application can be patented. Mere theories,
formulation of data or discoveries of laws can not be
patented unless they are applied practically in a physical,
chemical, or electrical process, to produce some new,
useful and tangible result.399
Scientific theories were not unpatentable because they lacked inventive
application; they were unpatentable because theories themselves did not
qualify as processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of
matter.400
The AAAS’s proposed sui generis regime defined eligible scientific
discoveries as follows:
a. At the time the discovery is made, it shall not be obvious
as to how the same could be utilized as a new and useful
manufacture.
b. The discovery shall be of such a nature that it may
subsequently lend itself to practical application for the
creation of a new manufacture . . . .401
categorical title: “Natural Process: Claims Have Usually Been Sustained When in Process Form,
Even If Pretty Close to Nature”).
398. AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., THE PROTECTION BY PATENTS OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADE
MARKS (1934) (Supp. to 79 SCIENCE).
399. Id. at 7. The standard of “new, useful, and tangible result” very much calls to mind the
language of State Street, although “tangible” here clearly imputes “physical.” See State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing
the standard for patentability of an abstract idea when reduced to a practical application as
producing “a useful, concrete and tangible result” (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S.
Ct. 3218 (2010))), also abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60).
400. See Richard Spencer, Scientific Property, 18 A.B.A. J. 79, 80 (1932) (stating that
scientific discoveries are unpatentable because they are not processes, machines, manufactures,
or compositions of matter as defined by statute).
401. AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., supra note 398, at 32. In the proposed
scheme, while the researcher would be required to register upon discovery, no rights would
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The sole purpose of the scheme was to provide protection that the patent
system could not; by defining its subject matter as those discoveries
without obvious applications, the AAAS report seems clearly premised
on the assumption that obvious applications of new discoveries were
patent eligible.
So in marking the boundary between discovery and invention, the
law approaching the midpoint of the twentieth century remained much
the same as it was when the century began. The patentability of natural
compounds and mental steps was contested, but for all other kinds of
inventions, the division remained between abstract principles on one
hand, and practical applications on the other.402 If anything, the courts
expanded the domain of invention at the expense of unpatentable
discovery. Claims in cases like Dick recited little beyond the patentee’s
new principle. As in the vitamin D cases, the courts either disregarded
Wall v. Leck entirely, or treated it as a mere requirement for some
artificial means. Likewise, when courts invoked Morton v. New York
Eye Infirmary, Morton usually stood for the proposition that some
physical medium or means was necessary to transmute the inventor’s
discovery into practical and patentable application.403
V. THE BIRTH OF INVENTIVE APPLICATION
The preceding Parts have shown that from the hot-blast cases of the
1840s through the mid-twentieth century, a doctrine of inventive
application was almost unknown in English and American patent law.
Practical application nearly always sufficed to transform a discovery
into patent-eligible subject matter. However, in 1948, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Funk Brothers404 announced a new requirement for
inventive application. Contemporaneous courts and commentators
recognized that Funk Brothers demanded inventive application for
patent eligibility, and recognized that demand as a radical departure
from established law. A small but significant line of cases in the 1950s
attach until the discovery became capable of practical exploitation. See id. at 32–33. At that
point, a compulsory licensing scheme kicked in. See id. at 33.
402. See RIVISE & CAESAR, supra note 322, § 31; Ruestow, supra note 297, at 92
(characterizing “principle of nature” cases as requiring the inventor to claim only tangible
manifestations of his discovery).
403. See, e.g., Miami Copper Co. v. Minerals Separation, Ltd., 244 F. 752, 756 (3d Cir.
1917) (“[I]n its naked sense a discovery is not patentable and can be embraced in and controlled
by a patent only when and to the extent that its principle is developed into invention by the
disclosure of a medium or means which brings it into practical action.” (citing Morton v. New
York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1862))); see also Cunningham Piano Co.
v. Aeolian Co., 255 F. 897, 900 (3d Cir. 1919) (citing Morton for the proposition that “very
simple means” suffices to transform discovery into invention).
404. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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and 1960s carried forward the Funk Brothers doctrine to Flook, which
in turn became the foundation of Mayo.
A. Funk Brothers
The true origin of inventive application as a test for patent eligibility
was Justice Douglas’s opinion in Funk Brothers.405 The patent in Funk
Brothers, entitled “Bacterial Inoculant for Leguminous Plants,” 406 dealt
with cultures of bacteria useful to promote nitrogen fixation in plants like
soy and alfalfa. 407 Bacteria of the genus Rhizobium exist in symbiotic
association with leguminous plants, forming root nodules that enable the
plant to fix atmospheric nitrogen. 408 It had long been the practice for
farmers to apply cultures of Rhizobium to seeds before planting to enhance
nitrogen fixation.409 However, each crop is susceptible to infection by a
different species of Rhizobium. 410 This presented a problem because
different species of Rhizobium inhibited each other’s nitrogen
fixation. 411 It was therefore necessary for producers to manufacture,
dealers to stock, and farmers to purchase a separate culture for each type
of leguminous crop.412
The patentee (Bond) discovered that particular naturally occurring
strains of Rhizobium would not inhibit each other’s activity when mixed
together.413 Hence, selected non-inhibitory strains could be combined in
the form of a “mixed culture,” a single product that could be conveniently
applied to a variety of different leguminous plants.414 Bond’s patent did not
identify any properties of the desired bacteria other than their noninhibition.415 Nor, in a time before biological deposits were common, did
the patent make available particular non-inhibitory strains. 416 It simply
instructed that one should culture candidate Rhizobia and determine
whether they inhibited each other’s action when applied to a host plant.417
405. Id.
406. U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 (filed Aug. 24, 1938) (issued May 14, 1940).
407. Id. at 1.
408. Id.
409. See id. at 2.
410. Id. at 1.
411. Id. at 2.
412. Id. The limited shelf life of bacterial cultures exacerbated the problem of dealing with
multiple separate cultures of Rhizobium. Brief for Respondent at 8–9, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (No. 280).
413. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
414. Id.
415. See ‘532 Patent, at 1, 5.
416. See John Edward Schneider, Note, Microorganisms and the Patent Office: To Deposit
or Not to Deposit, That Is the Question, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 592, 595–97 (1984) (discussing
history of deposit requirement).
417. See ‘532 Patent, at 5. Justice Felix Frankfurter regarded the claims as unpatentable not
because they were drawn to products of nature, but because the patentee had not provided
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Nonetheless, the patent claimed not only the method of producing a
mixed culture, but also broadly claimed all inoculants for leguminous
plants where the constituent strains were selected for their mutual noninhibition.418
The trial court held the asserted product claims invalid. 419 While
finding that Bond had indeed discovered the existence of non-inhibitory
strains in nature, the trial court regarded Bond’s discovery as beyond
the categories of patent-eligible subject matter enumerated by statute.420
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that
Bond had made an “inventive step” in the production and distribution of
inoculants,421 and that the mixed culture qualified as a new and useful
composition of matter. 422 The Supreme Court reversed in turn, with
Justice Douglas holding that the product claims did “not disclose an
invention or discovery within the meaning of the patent statutes.”423
Over the last few decades, Funk Brothers has often been
remembered as a case about products of nature. That view arises
because the usual exposure to Funk Brothers has been through the lens
of Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 424 In discussing whether Chakrabarty’s
genetically modified bacteria were products of nature (a discussion
entirely in dictum), 425 the Supreme Court cited the statement in Funk
sufficient disclosure to support claims encompassing all non-inhibitory mixtures of bacteria. See
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 133–34 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
418. See ‘532 Patent, at 7 (“4. An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of
selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium,
said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the
leguminous plant for which they are specific.”). Claim 4 was regarded as representative in the
litigation. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128 n.1.
419. Kalo Inoculant Co. v. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 161 F.2d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 1947)
(discussing the district judge’s findings), rev’d, 333 U.S. 127 (1948). The district court’s
opinion was not reported.
420. See id.; see also Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (defining as patentable “new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter”).
421. See Kalo, 161 F.2d at 985, 991.
422. See id. at 986.
423. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 132.
424. See 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980).
425. According to the Supreme Court, the claims in Chakrabarty were originally rejected
on the grounds that (1) bacteria were “products of nature,” and (2) that living things were not
patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 306. The Patent Office Board of Appeals did not
sustain the “product of nature” rejection. Id. at 306 & n.3. Because the Board of Appeals had
“ignored” a similar rejection in the Bergy case, which had been combined with Chakrabarty, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals felt it necessary to hold summarily that Bergy’s claim did
not define a product of nature. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 972–73 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff’d sub
nom., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. Bergy was not appealed. The Commissioner’s brief in
Chakrabarty raised and argued only the question of whether living organisms were patent
eligible. Brief for Petitioner, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (No. 79-136), 1980 WL 339757, at *5.
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Brothers that the patentee had discovered only “nature’s handiwork,”
and went on to quote the following:
Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the
package infects the same group of leguminous plants which
it always infected. No species acquires a different use. The
combination of species produces no new bacteria, no
change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of
the range of their utility. Each species has the same effect it
always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way.
Their use in combination does not improve in any way their
natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally
provided and act quite independently of any effort of the
patentee.426
The Court contrasted the unmodified bacteria in Funk Brothers with
the engineered bacteria produced by Chakrabarty, regarding the latter as
a creation of the inventor rather than “nature’s handiwork.” 427 More
recently, in Myriad, Justice Clarence Thomas characterized Funk
Brothers as holding “that the composition was not patent eligible
because the patent holder did not alter the bacteria in any way.”428
But while Justice Douglas refers to the general unpatentability of
natural laws and natural phenomena,429 he does not appear to have been
discussing products of nature. The early twentieth-century patent
literature commonly discussed the “product of nature” theory. 430 Yet
Justice Douglas neither refers to those cases431 nor uses that term. He
instead calls the patentee’s culture an aggregation.432 This was not an
accident; “aggregation” was a long-standing concept of patent law when
Funk Brothers was only raised by the applicant, who noted that no party in Funk Brothers had
challenged the claims because they encompassed living subject matter. Brief for Respondent,
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (No. 79-136), 1980 WL 339758, at *12–14.
426. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131).
427. Id. at 309–10.
428. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013)
(citing Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 132).
429. See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
430. See, e.g., RIVISE & CAESAR, supra note 322, § 28; GLASCOCK & STRINGHAM, supra
note 323, § 1226.
431. Most notably absent is a reference to the tungsten case, General Electric v. De Forest
Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1929). The defendant urged General Electric upon the Court.
See Brief for Petitioner at 26, Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127 (No. 280). While the defendant’s
argument on appeal touched on a variety of themes, the most consistent argument was that,
because mixed inoculants were old, the patentee had not created a novel structure by the use of
the law of nature. See id. at 31 (“Bond does not create a ‘novel structure,’ for the mixed
inoculant was known before him.”); see also id. at 15, 23.
432. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131 (“But we think that the aggregation of species fell short of
invention within the meaning of the patent statutes.”); id. (“The aggregation of select
strains . . . is an application of that newly-discovered natural principle.”).
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the Court decided Funk Brothers. The aggregation doctrine held that a
collection of old parts or steps was not patentable, unless some new or
different function emerged from the juxtaposition of known elements.433
In contrast to a patentable “combination,” an “aggregation” lacked
invention unless the known elements cooperated or synergized in some
fashion. 434 This was why Justice Douglas emphasized that Bond had
done nothing to alter the bacteria from their natural state, and that the
bacteria acquired no new function by Bond’s manipulations. Bond had
only collected old bacteria into a single package. Without some change
in the structure of the bacteria, or some change in their individual or
collective function, Bond’s mixed cultures were mere aggregations.435
Justice Douglas’s conclusion was questionable, even under such a
notoriously muddy doctrine as “aggregation.”436 While courts had denied
patentability to mere “judicious selections” of prior art elements as
aggregations,437 they upheld collections of old elements that achieved old
results more efficiently or economically as patentable combinations.438
Indeed, the Court itself had previously upheld patents where the
combination of old elements yielded a more effective and convenient
result, even if the elements merely performed their accustomed
functions.439
433. See Lincoln Eng’g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938) (“The
mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, perform or
produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced
by them, is not patentable invention.”).
434. See In re Gustafson, 331 F.2d 905, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
435. Compare Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131 (“Each species has the same effect it always
had. . . . Their use in combination does not improve in any way their natural functioning.”), with
Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, Inc., 307 U.S. 350, 355–56 (1939) (holding that the
claim to an old torch and cap was unpatentable aggregation because “[t]hey performed no joint
function. Each served as separately it had done”).
436. See Sachs v. Hartford Elec. Supply Co., 47 F.2d 743, 748 (2d Cir. 1931) (opinion of
Hand, J.) (“[W]e can find little advantage in a discussion of what is or what is not an
‘aggregation.’ . . . Any attempt to define it in general terms has always proved illusory; it is best
to abandon it.”), reh’g granted, 1931 WL 25758 (2d Cir. 1931) (per curiam); see also In re
Gustafson, 331 F.2d at 909 (opinion of Rich, J.) (celebrating the end of the “mental anguish” of
aggregation doctrine after passage of 1952 Patent Act).
437. See Newcomb, David Co. v. R.C. Mahon Co., 59 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 1932).
438. E.g., Weil Pump Co. v. Chi. Pump Co., 74 F.2d 13, 16 (7th Cir. 1934); Nat’l Hollow
Brake-Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake-Beam Co., 106 F. 693, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1901); see
also Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 135 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that the claimed inoculant
had the “new property of multi-service applicability”).
439. In Seabury v. Am Ende, the Court sustained the validity of a cotton wound dressing
containing boracic acid and glycerine. See 152 U.S. 561, 567–69 (1894). Even though the
elements performed only previously known functions, “the patentee was the first to perceive that
by combining these articles, in the manner he pointed out, there would be formed a convenient
and permanent dressing with the desirable qualities of the several constituents.” Id. at 567.
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Was Funk Brothers then a case about obviousness? An
“aggregation” was unpatentable because of its “lack of invention,” and
today one might call a collection of old parts with predictable functions
an obvious combination. Justice Douglas described the mixed inoculant
as an “aggregation of species” that “fell short of invention,”440 citing
Cuno Engineering v. Automatic Devices Corp.441—his infamous “flash
of creative genius” opinion442—for the proposition that a product claim
“must also satisfy the requirements of invention or discovery.” 443 A
number of commentators, albeit a minority, have therefore taken the
view that Funk Brothers should properly be regarded as an obviousness
case.444 Part of the attraction of such a position is that Funk Brothers
can then be dismissed as obsolete after the 1952 Patent Act eliminated
tests such as “invention” and “synergy” in favor of the nonobviousness
test under § 103.445
But the Court’s analysis makes it impossible to characterize Funk
Brothers as an obviousness case in the modern sense. Before Bond’s
discovery, there was no reason why one of ordinary skill in the art
would have combined different strains of bacteria. The prior art instead
taught that it was a “dangerous practice” to combine multiple
Rhizobium species in a composite inoculant.446 Even under the pre-1952
Patent Act, that fact would sustain the validity of a claim against a
challenge for “lack of patentable inventive quality” or “aggregation,” as
440. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
441. 314 U.S. 84 (1941), mandate amended by 314 U.S. 587 (1942).
442. Cuno Engineering held that an adaption or combination of old elements was
patentable only if it “reveal[ed] the flash of creative genius,” not merely ordinary skill in the art.
Id. at 91. Congress was commonly thought to have targeted this controversial phrase when it
enacted § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, embodying the requirement of nonobviousness. See
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (discussing “flash of creative genius” test).
443. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131–32.
444. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J.) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s treatment of Funk
Brothers in Chakrabarty as “again casting this case, more relating to obviousness, in terms of
§ 101”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); CHISUM, supra note 322,
§ 1.02[7][b]; Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 599 (2008)
[hereinafter Risch, Everything is Patentable] (characterizing Funk Brothers as an obviousness
case); Shine Tu, Funk Brothers—An Exercise in Obviousness, 80 UMKC L. REV. 637, 637
(2012); Karen Goodyear Krueger, Building a Better Bacterium: Genetic Engineering and the
Patent Law After Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Note, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 171 n.104 (1981)
(stating that Funk Brothers invalidated claimed compositions for obviousness).
445. See Brief for The Biotechnology Indus. Org. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(No. 12-398) (arguing that Funk Brothers’ mode of analysis, requiring “invention,” was
eliminated by and replaced by § 103 of 1952 Patent Act); Risch, Everything is Patentable, supra
note 444, at 599 (noting Funk Brothers’ reliance on pre-Act obviousness law).
446. See Kalo Inoculant Co. v. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 161 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 1947),
rev’d, 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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the Seventh Circuit pointed out when it rejected the defendant’s
charge.447 The only way to regard Funk Brothers as an obviousness case
is to assume that one of ordinary skill in the art was already aware of
Bond’s discovery. Such was not the state of the law at the time the
Court decided Funk Brothers.448
And that, of course, is the point. Whether Bond altered the bacteria
from their natural state, or whether the claimed inoculant was an
aggregation, were subsidiary questions in the case. Funk Brothers
radically redefined the boundary between discovery and invention by
withdrawing the discovery from the inventor’s account. Rather than a
practical application of the inventor’s discovery, Justice Douglas
demanded an inventive application for patent eligibility. The claim to a
mixed inoculant was not invalid simply because the bacteria were
unaltered from nature; innumerable inventions are combinations of
unaltered building blocks. The patents were invalid because once the
Court assumed away the discovery of compatible strains, the mixed
culture became nothing more than the aggregation of known elements
with predictable results.
The discovery that certain strains could be combined was, for Justice
Douglas, a basic scientific fact:
Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of
these bacteria can be mixed without harmful effect to the
properties of either is a discovery of their qualities of noninhibition. It is no more than the discovery of some of the
handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable.449
Patentable invention could reside only in its application: “If there is to
be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application
of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”450
The distinction between an unpatentable discovery and a patentable
application was hardly new. What was new in Funk Brothers was the
demand that the practical application be “inventive” as well. Justice
Douglas did not ask whether there was an invention in the application of
the patentee’s discovery; he asked whether there was invention. Prior to
Funk Brothers, inventiveness in the underlying discovery sufficed to
confer inventiveness in the application.451 But for Justice Douglas, the
447. Id.
448. See Norman J. O’Malley, Recent Decisions, Patents—The Discovery and Application
of a Principle of Nature Is Not Inventive if the Application Would be Obvious to Anyone
Knowing the Principle, 36 GEO. L.J. 703, 706 (1948).
449. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
450. Id. at 130.
451. See, e.g., supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s analysis
in De Forest Radio); see also supra notes 370–76 (discussing the court’s analysis in Guaranty
Trust).
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question was whether the application itself, beyond the discovery, was
sufficiently inventive to merit a patent.452
Patentability in Funk Brothers was thus predicated on the ingenuity
in the application, not the ingenuity of the discovery. Though the
discovery of bacterial compatibility might have been “ingenious,” the
practical application of that discovery simply identified compatible
bacteria and combined them according to methods known in the art.453
Once the patentee’s discovery had already been made, that application
in the form of a mixed culture would have been well within the ordinary
skill in the art.454
Or to put it in the language of Mayo, given the natural phenomenon
of non-inhibition, the patentee’s application in the form of a mixed
inoculant was nothing more than “well-understood, routine,
conventional activity” already engaged in by workers in the field. 455
That was the point of Justice Douglas’s discussion of “aggregation”:
Once he took the compatibility of the bacteria as a given, then even the
emergent property of the system—non-inhibition—became nothing
more than the expected result of combining elements of known
function. If the Court assumed away the cooperative functioning of the
bacteria in the mixed culture, then the mixture truly was an aggregation,
given that the patentee had altered neither the structure nor the function
of the individual bacteria themselves.
Justice Douglas clearly recognized that the resulting mixture would
be “inventive” in the sense of nonobviousness over the prior art, if the
patentee had been the first to discover compatible strains. But an act of
discovery was not an act of invention. Though an inventor might have
discovered a new principle, a patent could not borrow from discovery to
the credit of invention:
That is to say, there is no invention here unless the
discovery that certain strains of the several species of these
bacteria are non-inhibitive and may thus be safely mixed is
invention. But we cannot so hold without allowing a patent
to issue on one of the ancient secrets of nature now
disclosed. All that remains, therefore, are advantages of the
mixed inoculants themselves. They are not enough.456
452. See id. at 131 (“But however ingenious the discovery of that natural principle may
have been, the application of it is hardly more than an advance in the packaging of the
inoculants.”).
453. Id.
454. See id. at 132 (“But once nature’s secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains
of the species of Rhizobium was discovered, the state of the art made the production of a mixed
inoculant a simple step.”).
455. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
456. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 132.
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For Justice Douglas, permitting Bond to patent the direct application of
his discovery, without some intermediating inventive act, would be
sanctioning a monopoly on a law of nature.
B. The Reaction to Funk Brothers
In contrast to modern commentary that has tended to characterize Funk
Brothers as a product of nature or obviousness case, commentary in the
immediate wake of Funk Brothers recognized its true nature.
Contemporaneous commentators recognized that Funk Brothers demanded
inventive application as a condition of patentability. 457 Moreover, those
commentators further recognized that such a demand departed radically
from the state of the law at the time. For example, a comment in the
Minnesota Law Review argued:
[T]he Court formerly awarded a patent to one who
succeeded in teaching his creation so as to advance the
prior art without regard to whether his effort consisted
more largely of discovery or of invention. . . . The holding
of the majority in the instant case appears to be an
unrealistic departure from this approach to invention.458
Likewise, a comment in the Georgetown Law Journal noted:
Though an advance may seem simple in retrospect, its
very simplicity coupled with the fact that the prior art is
void of sufficient teaching to light the way has almost
universally been considered an inventive step. Previously,
it was only the discoverer who was allowed to patent means
made simple and obvious by his discovery. The
unobviousness of the discovery cloaked the simple step
with the ingenuity required of a patentable invention.459
This commentary makes clear how contemporaneous observers
understood Funk Brothers: that it imposed a test of inventive
457. See Howard W. Haftel, Comment, Patent Law—Patentability as Affected by the Law
of Nature Rules—The Kalo Doctrine, 47 MICH. L. REV. 391, 392 (1949) (“Thus the practical
application, apart from the discovery of the law of nature, must itself show inventive genius.
The Court admitted that in this case the discovery of the law of nature was ingenious, but held
that once the law was known its practical application merely required the exercise of ordinary
skill.”); see also Recent Cases, Patents—Validity—Invention in Discovery of Principles of
Nature, 33 MINN. L. REV., 430, 431 (1949) [hereinafter Patents—Validity—Invention];
O’Malley, supra note 448, at 703–04.
458. Patents—Validity—Invention, supra note 457, at 433; see also Haftel, supra note 457,
at 398 (pointing out that Funk Brothers’ doctrine was inconsistent with the Court’s treatment of
the Langmuir patents in De Forest Radio).
459. O’Malley, supra note 448, at 706 (citations omitted).
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application, and that such a test represented a departure from the
historical standard of patent eligibility.460
The pharmaceutical industry was sufficiently alarmed by Funk
Brothers to raise the issue in before Congress in the hearings leading up
to the enactment of 1952 Patent Act. In hearings held in 1951 on H.R.
3760 (a precursor to the 1952 Patent Act), a representative of the
veterinary pharmaceutical industry, I. J. Fellner, testified before a
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on proposed § 101.461
Fellner’s testimony is revealing: the patent community saw Funk
Brothers as imposing a new and unprecedented requirement for
inventive application. 462 Moreover, the dialogue between Fellner and
the members of the Subcommittee may be the only evidence on whether
Congress intended to embrace or reject Funk Brothers and its demand
for inventive application in the 1952 Patent Act.
According to Fellner, Funk Brothers called into doubt the
patentability of inventions “where a discovery has been made which
involves a natural principle and is useful and practically applicable, but
such application of the newly discovered principle of nature does not in
itself call for inventive ingenuity.”463 He therefore urged Congress to
clarify that newly discovered laws of nature, if embodied in new and
useful applications, remained patentable.464
Anticipating the reaction of the modern pharmaceutical industry to
Mayo, Fellner argued that the Court’s exclusion of discovery from the
patentability inquiry would endanger any patent based on a newly
discovered use for a known compound:
But what would happen if we went along with the decision
of the Supreme Court in the Funk Bros. case is that about
90 percent of the patents in the pharmaceutical industry
would have to be thrown out
....

460. See also Norman Siebrasse, The Rule Against Abstract Claims: A Critical Perspective
on U.S. Jurisprudence, 27 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 3, 9–10 (2011) (arguing that Funk Brothers
was the first modern departure from the rule that any practical application was patent eligible).
461. See Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 82nd Cong. 116–18 (1951) [hereinafter Patent Law
Codification and Revision] (statement of I. J. Fellner, Manager, Patent Department, Dr.
Salsbury’s Laboratories).
462. See id. at 117–18.
463. See id. at 118. Fellner may have had some connection to Patent Act co-drafter and
soon-to-be-CCPA-Judge Giles Rich, see id. at 150. Rich represented the company in antitrust
litigation a few years later. See Dr. Salsbury’s Labs. v. I. D. Russell Co. Labs., 212 F.2d 414,
414 (8th Cir. 1954).
464. See Patent Law Codification and Revision, supra note 461, at 117–18.
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Now most of these inventions representing the discovery
of new effects in known chemicals would be absolutely
nonpatentable, under the Funk [B]rothers decision.465
Fellner’s testimony also raises a question regarding the extent to which
Congress had Funk Brothers in mind when it enacted § 100 of the 1952
Patent Act, which defined “invention” as “invention or discovery.”466 For
although the modern Supreme Court has never treated the exclusion of
fundamental principles as an ordinary problem of statutory
interpretation, understanding Congress’s intent with respect to Funk
Brothers should be crucial to interpreting §§ 100 and 101 of the 1952
Patent Act. Unfortunately, the legislative history on point is almost
perfectly ambiguous.
Section § 4886 of the earlier patent statute, the Act of 1870, had
already used the language “invented or discovered” in its definition of
patentability.467 However, an earlier draft of the proposed new patent
law, H.R. 9133, had included language expressly defining discoveries
embodied in one of the statutory classes of patent-eligible subject
matter. The earlier draft had defined patent-eligible subject matter to
include inventions “in the nature of a discovery as embodied in a new
and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter . . .”468
Later, H.R. 3760 had dropped that language, substituting in its place a
new definition in § 100, which stated that “[t]he term ‘invention’
includes discoveries”, and revised the text of § 101 to its current
form.469
Fellner urged the Subcommittee to return to the language of H.R.
9133, expressly extending the patent system to discoveries embodied in
one of the statutory classes of subject matter. That language, according
to Fellner, would overrule Funk Brothers and restore patentability to
practical applications of new discoveries. 470 But the Subcommittee’s
response was equivocal. On the one hand, members of the
Subcommittee told Fellner that including “discoveries” in the definition
of invention in § 100 accomplished the same purpose as the language
that had appeared in H.R. 9133. 471 On the other hand, members told
Fellner that the new § 100 and § 101 were not intended to change the
465. See id. at 118. According to Fellner, inventions based on new uses of old compounds
were patentable prior to Funk Brothers. See id at 117–18.
466. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, ch. 950, § 100, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012)).
467. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870).
468. Patent Law Codification and Revision, supra note 461, at 117 (emphasis added).
469. See id. at 5–6.
470. See id. at 117–18.
471. See id. at 120–21 (statement of Mr. Willis) (pointing out new definition of invention
including discoveries in § 100); id. at 121 (statement of Mr. Crumpacker) (same).

634

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

law as then written, 472 and that if the Supreme Court had interpreted
“invented or discovered” in the 1870 Patent Act as it had in Funk
Brothers, then they would likely interpret the “discovery as embodied”
language of H.R. 9133 in the same way.473
Yet according to L. James Harris, who had been counsel to the
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Subcommittee, and who claimed to
have supervised the drafting and revision process leading to the 1952
Patent Act,474
[t]he primary purpose of the inclusion [of ‘discovery’ in
§ 100] was to make it clear that a discovery could be
patented as well as an invention, if it were embodied in one
of the classes of patentable subject matter.
....
It was intended to protect an inventive contribution where
the contribution is embodied in a class of subject matter
which is patentable.475
Noting the recent controversy over Funk Brothers, 476 Harris denied
that “Congress intended that invention must be in a mechanical
structure and that a discovery could not be patentable whether or not it
was embodied in some useful process or composition.”477 Thus from
Harris’s point of view, it would seem that Congress intended to abolish
Funk Brothers’ test of inventive application, to the extent that test
denied patentability to a discovery embodied in a composition of matter.
Yet, while Harris was explicit when he claimed that Congress intended
§ 103 to overturn Cuno Engineering’s infamous “flash of genius”
requirement,478 he never states explicitly that Congress intended §§ 100
and 101 to overrule Funk Brothers. So in the end, the legislative history
is largely inconclusive as to whether Congress intended to reject or
incorporate a test of inventive application in the 1952 Patent Act.
472. See id. at 121 (statement of Mr. Bryson) (“There is no intention to change the law as it
is presently written; the purpose is just to make it clearer.”); see also id. (statement of Mr.
Willis) (stating that H.R. 3760 was not intended to accomplish what Fellner sought).
473. See id. at 122 (statement of Mr. Crumpacker) (“[I]f the Supreme Court has interpreted
the words as you indicate, I do not see how including that language in the paragraph would
cause them to make a different interpretation.”).
474. See L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent
Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 658 n.* (1954–1955).
475. Id. at 665 (footnote omitted). Harris emphasized that “mere scientific discoveries per
se,” not embodied in a statutory class, remained unpatentable. See id. Harris also emphasized
that the revision in § 101 from the language of H.R. 9133 was not substantive. See id. at 663–65.
476. See id. at 663–64.
477. See id. at 663.
478. See id. at 674–80 (discussing the congressional intent to replace the “flash of genius”
test).
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C. Funk Brothers’ Progeny
Regardless of whether the 1952 Patent Act overruled Funk Brothers
or not, it is clear that commentators recognized Funk Brothers as an
inventive application test at the time it was decided. But why have more
recent commentators seldom acknowledged this aspect of the case? In
part, this is because most modern readers encounter Funk Brothers
through Chakrabarty, which frames Funk Brothers as a product of
nature case. Perhaps more significantly, Funk Brothers’ reference to
Cuno Engineering, and its talk of “lack of invention,” leads the casual
reader to suppose that Funk Brothers’ doctrinal foundation rests on the
amorphous law of “invention” that existed before the 1952 Patent Act.
If the 1952 Patent Act swept away that doctrinal clutter and supplanted
it with the pristine law of nonobviousness,479 then the 1952 Patent Act
made Funk Brothers irrelevant a few years after its promulgation.
1. The Davison Chemical Line
That, however, was not the case. Notwithstanding the subsequent
passage of the 1952 Patent Act, the circuit courts of appeal did not
ignore Funk Brothers’ inventive application analysis. In a small but
significant line of cases decided between 1950 and 1968, the circuit
courts employed Funk Brothers’ inventive application test to invalidate
claims based on the discovery of a new law of nature or natural
phenomenon. These cases, in part through their contribution to Flook,
establish a thread of continuity between Funk Brothers and Mayo. They
may also portend the future. The claims that were historically
invalidated for lack of an “inventive application” exemplify claims that
may be vulnerable to subject-matter challenges in Mayo’s wake.
Two years after Funk Brothers, the Seventh Circuit applied Funk
Brothers’ analysis in Davison Chemical Corp. v. Joliet Chemicals,
Inc. 480 Davison Chemical dealt with a process for producing silica
gel.481 While the process for making silica gel was known in the art, the
patentee had discovered that the temperature of the wash step determined
the size of the gel’s pores.482 He therefore claimed an improved process of
adjusting the temperature of the wash step to control the density of the final
product.483 But the Seventh Circuit regarded the relationship between wash
479. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1295–96 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that inquiries into
“inventiveness” and “invention” were replaced by the test of nonobviousness in § 103), aff’d,
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
480. 179 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 1950).
481. Id. at 793.
482. Id. at 794.
483. Id.

636

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

temperature and pore size as a “newly discovered scientific fact.”484 Under
Funk Brothers, the patentee’s application of that fact was required to be
inventive.485 According to the court, once the patentee discovered the
relationship between temperature and pore size, the application in the
form of the improved process was not inventive:
[W]e assume that [the inventor] Connolly discovered that
the temperature of the wash water determined the pore size
and, therefore, the specific gravity or density of the gel but,
we think, that, once having discovered this, it required
nothing more than the ordinary skill of the scientist to
determine that maintaining the temperature of the water at a
constant point would make the size of the pore, and the
density of the silica gel, uniform.486
In other words, once the inventor’s discovery was assumed away, the
additional steps of the method became nothing more than “wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by
researchers in the field.” 487 The Seventh Circuit therefore held the
claims invalid.488
The CCPA followed Davison Chemical in In re Arnold,489 involving
a claim to a process of electrostatic welding.490 The process of heating
materials by alternating electrostatic fields was known.491 But the patent
applicant had discovered that molecules near the surface of a material
responded more readily than interior molecules to alternating
electrostatic fields.492 By choosing a particular frequency based on the
response of surface molecules, the applicant could selectively weld
either the surface of the material or a plasticizer applied to the
surface.493
But according to the CCPA, the fact that surface molecules had a
different anomalous dispersion range compared to the interior
molecules was a “phenomenon of nature” that had been discovered by
the applicant.494 Arnold’s application—choosing a frequency that would
484. See id.
485. See id. at 795.
486. Id. at 795.
487. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
488. Davison Chem., 179 F.2d at 795.
489. 185 F.2d 686 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
490. Id. at 687.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 687–88. The basis for this effect was said to be the difference in anomalous
dispersion range of a dipolar substance between the interior and surface molecules. See id. at
690–91.
493. See id. at 688.
494. See id. at 691.
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selectively weld the surface molecules—was merely the result of his
discovery. 495 The claims accordingly lacked “invention” under Funk
Brothers.496
National Lead Co. v. Western Lead Products Co.497 was similar to
Davison Chemical. In a process for making a lead/lead oxide suspension
(useful for storage batteries), the patentee had supposedly discovered
that two different crystalline forms of lead oxide were present.498 The
patentee further claimed to have discovered that the temperature of the
reaction determined the relative proportions of the two crystalline forms
of lead oxide. 499 By regulating the temperature of the reaction, the
patentee could control the proportion of these two forms and thereby
control the uniformity of the final product. 500 The patentee therefore
claimed an improved process, in which the temperature of the reaction
was held within particular ranges by regulating the rate of influx of
molten lead.501
However, even assuming that the patentee had been the first to discover
these phenomena, the Ninth Circuit held the process not patentable under
Funk Brothers.502 The court considered the relationship between reaction
temperature and product uniformity to be a scientific fact or law of
nature.503 The question then was whether the patentee’s application of
that law was inventive:
Our inquiry must therefore focus upon whether an artisan,
knowing that the temperature of the reaction determines the
uniformity of the product, would require more than
ordinary skill to discover the process of controlling the
reaction temperature by varying the feed of molten lead
into the [prior art] Barton pot.504

495. See id.
496. See id. Arnold did eventually succeed in patenting other claims from the same
application. See U.S. Patent No. 2,575,251 (filed Sept. 9, 1943) (issued Nov. 13, 1951). As
precedent of the CCPA, In re Arnold is technically binding upon the Federal Circuit, though no
decision of the court has cited it. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 1982) (establishing all holdings of the CCPA as binding precedent on the Federal Circuit).
497. 324 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1963).
498. See id. at 541, 542.
499. Id. at 541.
500. See id.
501. See id. at 540–41.
502. Id. at 541–42, 545.
503. See id. at 541–42 (citing Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems., 179 F.2d 793 (7th
Cir. 1950)).
504. Id. at 542.
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The patentee’s method of regulating temperature was simply to
regulate the rate at which molten lead fed into the reaction vessel.505
Because there was nothing inventive in regulating the influx of molten
lead, the method of performing the reaction at an optimized temperature
was unpatentable.506
Contrasting National Lead with a pre-Funk Brothers decision
illustrates how Funk Brothers shifted the landscape of patentability.
United Verde Copper Co. v. Peirce-Smith Converter Co.,507 decided by
the Third Circuit in 1925, presented facts very similar to National Lead.
The process of copper smelting had long been hampered by the tendency
of silicate slag to attack the unprotected lining of the smelting vessel.508
However, the patentee discovered that limiting the temperature of the
slag could prevent the slag from eroding the vessel’s lining.509 Much
like the patentee in National Lead, the patentee in United Verde Copper
regulated the temperature of the slagging step by controlling the
temperature and composition of the silica flux added during the
smelting process.510 It did not appear that there was anything inventive
about that solution. Yet it was sufficient that the patentee, having
discovered the properties of hot versus cold slag, had disclosed a
medium or means by which his discovery could be brought to practical
application.511
Returning to the Davison Chemical line of authority, perhaps the starkest
illustration of the reach of the inventive application test was the Third
Circuit’s decision in Armour Pharmaceutical Co. v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. 512 The patentee made the surprising discovery that trypsin—a
proteolytic enzyme with anti-inflammatory properties—could be
absorbed by the small intestine and thereafter transported into the
bloodstream. 513 The prior art had administered trypsin to patients via
injection or other cumbersome methods. 514 But in light of the small
intestine’s ability to absorb the enzyme, the patentee determined that
505. Id. at 541.
506. See id. at 542–45.
507. 7 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1925).
508. See id. at 13–14. It was therefore necessary to periodically apply the silicate flux to
the sides of the smelting vessel, rather than simply add it to the input. See id. at 14.
509. See id. at 15.
510. See id.
511. See id. at 15–16 (“Having made this discovery he was the first to show the art the
difference between a vicious slag and an innocent slag and he proceeded to embody this
discovery in an invention which avoided one and obtained the other.”).
512. 396 F.2d 70, 75 (3d Cir. 1968).
513. See id. at 71–72. The discovery was unexpected, due to the large size of the trypsin
molecule and the fact that the human body already secretes these enzymes into the digestive
system. Id.
514. See id. at 71–72.
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oral administration would be possible if the trypsin was given a coating
permitting it to resist digestion in the stomach and reach the small
intestine intact. 515 The patentee therefore claimed a composition of
trypsin given an enteric coating for use in the treatment of
inflammation.516
Though the Third Circuit regarded the patentee’s invention as
precisely the sort of discovery the patent laws ought to protect, the court
felt bound by Funk Brothers to invalidate the claim.517 The ability of the
small intestine to absorb trypsin and similar enzymes was, according to
the court, a natural phenomenon.518 Under Funk Brothers, the question
of patentability was whether anything more than ordinary skill would be
necessary to reach the patentee’s application of that discovery.519 The
answer was no, as the court concluded that “[o]nce nature’s secret that the
ileum would absorb trypsin was uncovered, any artisan would have known
the process of enterically coating the trypsin to enable it to pass through the
acidic environment of the stomach and continue into the ileum.”520 And
even if the patentee’s discovery was the anti-inflammatory effect of
trypsin administered to the small intestine, not merely the ability of the
small intestine to absorb trypsin, the application of that newly
discovered principle still lacked inventiveness under Funk Brothers.521
Commentators have occasionally classified the Davison Chemical
cases, like Funk Brothers, as obviousness cases. 522 Yet, as in Funk
Brothers, without the patentees’ discoveries, none of the inventions in
these cases would have been obvious in the prior art. Nor can National
Lead and Armour Pharmaceutical, decided in 1963 and 1968

515. See id. at 71 & n.3.
516. See id. at 71 n.3.
517. See id. at 73 (“Thus, it would seem that allowing a patent on the restricted use Martin
made of his discovery of a natural phenomenon would not only be consistent with our patent
laws, but would further their purpose. The employment of the newly discovered principle of
nature would remain open to all those desiring to utilize it. We discern no requirement in the
policy of the patent law that the method by which the discovery be utilized also be a new
method. However, the Supreme Court and several courts of appeal have held to the contrary.”
(footnote omitted)).
518. See id. at 72.
519. Id. at 74.
520. Id.
521. See id. at 75.
522. See, e.g., ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, 2 LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 6:34 (3d ed. 1985); Joseph P. Anderson III, Note, Distinguishing Patentable Process Claims
from Unpatentable Laws of Nature in the Medical Technology Field, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1203,
1208, 1220 (2008) (framing the analysis in Armour Pharmaceutical as an application of the
obviousness test for patentability).
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respectively, 523 be easily dismissed as aberrations no longer relevant
after the 1952 Patent Act dispensed with the requirement of “invention.”
2. Flook: Funk Brothers Revived
This examination of Funk Brothers and its progeny has significant
implications for our view of Mayo. The Federal Circuit’s initial
reception of Mayo denied that Mayo demands an inventive application
for a law of nature or abstract idea to become patent eligible. When the
Federal Circuit heard CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. en banc, the court failed
to agree on a framework for the analysis of “abstract ideas” under
§ 101. 524 Instead, division among the court’s judges produced two
principal opinions with significantly different views on the patenteligibility analysis.525
Yet both opinions agreed that Mayo’s requirement for an “inventive
concept” had nothing to do with inventive application. Thus, Judge
Alan Lourie, writing on behalf of four other members of the court,
denied that the Supreme Court’s “occasional use” of the term “inventive
concept”—Judge Lourie believed the Court had introduced the term in
Flook—entailed any requirement of inventiveness in the § 101
inquiry.526 The novelty or nonobviousness of the patentee’s application
was irrelevant to the question of patent-eligible subject matter. 527
Rather, “inventive concept” only required that the subject matter in the
claim, beyond the fundamental principle, be the “product of human
ingenuity.”528
Judge Randall Rader, writing on behalf of three other judges, 529
agreed that the 1952 Patent Act forbade “any requirement for
‘inventiveness’ beyond sections 102 and 103.”530 “Inventive concept,”
as used by the Supreme Court in Mayo, could not be interpreted to
523. Nat’l Lead Co. v. W. Lead Prods. Co., 324 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1963); Armour Pharm.
Co. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 396 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1968).
524. 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
525. See id. at 1273 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 1292 (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
526. Id. at 1273, 1282 (Lourie, J., concurring).
527. See id. at 1284.
528. Id. at 1283. For Judge Lourie, fundamental principles could be discovered but not
“invented”; thus the application had to be the product of human ingenuity. See id. While
scientific truths may be discovered rather than invented, it is difficult to see how abstract ideas
such as risk hedging, or a financial exchange’s employment of shadow records and trusted
intermediaries, are “discovered.”
529. Id. at 1292 (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judges Richard Linn
and Kathleen O’Malley joined Judge Rader’s § 101 analysis, but interpreted the method claims
to require computer implementation. See id. at 1313; id. at 1329–31 (Linn and O’Malley, JJ.,
dissenting). The method claims would therefore be patent eligible under Judge Rader’s analysis.
See id. at 1313 (Rader, J., concurring).
530. Id. at 1297 (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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instill “inventiveness” or “ingenuity” into questions of patent
eligibility.531 Rather, “inventive concept” should be read as shorthand
for the requirement that a patent-eligible claim must include steps
beyond those inherently necessary to implement the abstract idea.532
These denials become less plausible given Mayo’s roots in Funk
Brothers. For the Supreme Court revived the analysis from Funk Brothers
in Mayo. Funk Brothers demanded “invention” in the patentee’s application
of a law of nature.533 Mayo begins with the fundamental premise that an
unpatentable principle, such as a law of nature or abstract idea, becomes
a patent-eligible application only when combined with a further
“inventive concept.”534 In Funk Brothers, once the patentee discovered
the non-inhibitive qualities of the Rhizobia, the creation of a mixed
culture was routine to one of ordinary skill in the art.535 In Mayo, once
the patentee discovered the relationship between thioguanine levels and
therapeutic efficacy, the creation of a process for optimizing dosage
required nothing more than “routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field.”536 In both cases, the form of the
Court’s inquiry was the same: assume the existence of the underlying
principle, and ask whether the patentee’s application required something
“inventive.”
The Mayo Court did not expressly ground its requirement of
inventive concept, or its conclusion that “conventional and obvious”
activity cannot confer patent eligibility, in Justice Douglas’s opinion in
Funk Brothers. But Mayo’s resemblance to Funk Brothers is clearly by
direct descent, not parallel evolution. Mayo’s “inventive concept” came
directly from Parker v. Flook.537 In Flook, Justice Stevens wrote: “Even
though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be well
known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented.
Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a
patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”538
Undeniably, Flook’s inventive concept is synonymous with inventive
application. This is the core of Flook: the difference between an
unpatentable principle and a patent-eligible invention is invention in the
application.539 But Flook took this core from Funk Brothers. It was from
Funk Brothers that Justice Stevens drew the fundamental distinction
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.

Id. at 1302.
See id. at 1303.
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–32 (1948).
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 132.
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294–95.
See id. at 1294 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).
See id.
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between discovery and invention: “If there is to be invention from such
a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a
new and useful end.” 540 According to Justice Stevens, Funk Brothers,
along with Mackay Radio, required that the fundamental principle—a
mathematical algorithm in Flook—be disregarded when assessing whether
the patentee’s claimed application was inventive.541 Yet, Mackay Radio
assumed that the “logical application” of a mathematical algorithm—an
application lacking inventiveness—represented patent-eligible subject
matter. 542 In this aspect, Funk Brothers was the sole intellectual
progenitor of Flook and, by descent, of Mayo as well.
The thread from Funk Brothers to Flook passes directly through the
Davison Chemical line. When the Commissioner of Patents appealed
Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972, the Solicitor’s opening argument against
patent eligibility rested, for the most part, on two premises: first, the
claimed process of converting binary coded decimal numbers was an
unpatentable mental process;543 and second, computer programs should
not be patentable absent some indication from Congress.544 But six years
later, in Parker v. Flook, the Solicitor’s entire argument rested on one
premise: Abstract ideas were not patentable “absent invention in the
application of the idea.” 545 According to the Solicitor, “[t]o merit
monopoly protection, it is not sufficient that a claim embody a concrete,
tangible application of a mathematical or scientific principle; it must
also extend beyond the routine, conventional, or uninventive
applications that follow once the applicant possesses the idea.”546 The
Solicitor’s primary authority was, of course, Funk Brothers, 547 but

540. Id. at 591 (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130).
541. See id. at 591–92.
542. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); see also
supra text accompanying notes 312–17.
543. See Brief for Petitioner, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (No. 71-485), 1972
WL 137527, at *17.
544. See id. at *32–33.
545. Brief for Petitioner, Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (No. 77-642), 1978 WL 206636, at *13
(emphasis added). The shift in the government’s position actually began between the opening
and reply briefs in Benson. E-mail from Richard H. Stern, Att’y for the Dep’t of Justice in
Benson and Flook, to author (May 12, 2014, 12:40 PDT) (on file with author); see also Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (No. 71-485) (“But if a translation of an
unpatentable mathematical principle could itself become patentable, it could only do so by
reason of a further inventive ingredient, such as a novel and unobvious device for carrying out
the translated principle, or if a conventional device were used then a new and unconventional
synergism or cooperation between the conventional device and the translation of the
mathematical principle.”).
546. Brief for Petitioner, Flook, supra note 545, at *19.
547. See id. at *19–20 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
131 (1948)).
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Davison Chemical and its progeny featured almost as prominently as
Funk Brothers.548
Given the Supreme Court’s pretense that Diehr is entirely consistent
with the analysis in Flook and in Mayo, 549 one can hardly fault the
Federal Circuit’s heroic attempts to exclude inventiveness from Mayo’s
inventive concept. Yet when one considers that (1) Mayo’s analysis
recapitulates Justice Douglas’s in Funk Brothers, (2) the thread of
inventive application runs from Funk Brothers to Flook through the
Davison Chemical line, and (3) Flook’s inventive concept was
synonymous with inventive application, it becomes increasingly
difficult to maintain that the Supreme Court spoke loosely or
colloquially when it spoke of inventive concept in Flook and Mayo.
Rather, inventive application was the fundamental principle of patent
eligibility articulated in Funk Brothers, and Mayo’s heritage from Funk
Brothers suggests that inventive application lies at the heart of Mayo as
well.
If inventive application is the test for patent eligibility in the future,
then the Davison Chemical line also provides some guidance on what
kinds of inventions might be challenged under an inventive application
analysis. Davison Chemical, In re Arnold, and National Lead were all
cases where the optimization of a known process consisted of
performing the process under conditions indicated by the patentee’s (or
applicant’s) underlying discovery. 550 Mayo was also such a case: its
patentee claimed the performance of a known process of treating
548. See id. at *20–21,*21 n.19 (citing Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems., Inc., 179
F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1950), Armour Pharm. Co. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 396 F.2d 70 (3d Cir.
1968) and National Lead Co. v. W. Lead Prods. Co., 324 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1963)). In re
Arnold, 185 F.2d 686 (C.C.P.A. 1950), was not cited, but the Solicitor also cited Loew’s DriveIn Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949), and Templeton Patents,
Ltd. v. J. R. Simplot Co., 336 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1964). See id. at *21 n.19. Loew’s Drive-In
Theaters concerned a patent for the structure of a drive-in theater, which pre-Funk Brothers had
been held patentable by the Ninth Circuit. See Park-In Theatres v. Rogers, 130 F.2d 745, 746,
748 (9th Cir. 1942). Loew’s Drive-In Theaters did not cite Funk Brothers, but framed the
patentability question as whether, “given the idea or conception of an open-air drive-in theatre,
an exercise of the inventive faculty was required to devise the means for carrying it out.” Loew’s
Drive-In Theaters, 174 F.2d at 551. Templeton Patents, which concerned a process of drying
potatoes, is perhaps more analogous to De Forest Radio: discovering a scientific explanation
cannot render otherwise obvious applications patentable. See Templeton Patents, 336 F.2d at
264 (“[A]ll this discovery did was to supply a scientific explanation of why this already wellknown method of drying . . . was particularly well suited to the dehydration of potatoes.”). The
Solicitor had also raised some of these cases in Dann v. Johnston, See Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219, 220 (1976); Brief for Petitioner, Dann, 425 U.S. 219 (No. 74-1033), 1975 WL
173464, at *22–23.
549. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94
(2012).
550. See supra Subsection V.C.1.
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gastrointestinal disorders, but with the dosage optimized according to
the patentee’s correlation between metabolite levels and therapeutic
efficacy.551 The lesson from the historical record is that any claim to an
improvement of an old process, at least where that improvement does
not involve new compositions or modalities, is questionable under an
inventive application analysis.
More generally, the historical record suggests patentability problems
for inventions where the advance has been to recognize the nature of a
problem in the prior art. Prior to Funk Brothers, it was quite clear under
the Supreme Court’s precedent that invention might subsist in the
inventor’s recognition of a problem in the prior art. 552 And after the
passage of the 1952 Patent Act, as a question of obviousness, it became
black-letter law that a “patentable invention may lie in the discovery of
the source of a problem even though the remedy may be obvious once
the source of the problem is identified.”553 But if one characterizes that
discovery as a “law of nature,” then any solution that does not require
novel processes or materials becomes suspect for lack of inventive
application. The patentees in Davison Chemical and National Lead had
arguably discovered that problems of reproducibility in the prior art
processes resulted from a failure to control the temperature of the
reaction; once the problem was known, the solution was obvious.
Likewise, In re Arnold might be viewed as a case where the limitation
of the prior art process was a failure to recognize the differential
excitability of surface and interior molecules; once that differential
response was discovered, it was obvious to solve the problem by
adjusting the frequency of the welding process. Or suppose Funk
Brothers had been a case where the patentee had been the first to
discover that mixed cultures functioned poorly because incompatible
bacterial strains inhibited nitrogen fixation. The patentee might have
solved the problem by providing a mixed culture of compatible strains.
Yet given Justice Douglas’s premise that the patentee did not “create
[the] state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria,” 554 that
solution would have been unpatentable. The discovery that different
types of bacteria in mixed cultures were mutually inhibitive would have
been just as much a law of nature as the discovery of non-inhibitory
bacteria, and the subsequent application just as obvious.
551. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294–95. Arguably Neilson was also an optimization case, at least
when the Supreme Court characterized it as a process case in Tilghman. See Tilghman v.
Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 725 (1880).
552. Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 68 (1923) (“It was the
discovery of the source not before known[,] and the application of the remedy[,] for which Eibel
was entitled to be rewarded in his patent.”).
553. See In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 585 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
554. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (7th Cir. 1948).
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CONCLUSION
It is quite clear from the historical context, extending from Funk
Brothers to Flook, that Mayo’s inventive concept requires inventive
application for a law of nature or abstract idea to become patent eligible.
Yet it is equally clear that when Funk Brothers introduced the notion of
inventive application in 1948, the case broke radically with a century of
English and American precedent, under which practical application was
sufficient to confer patent eligibility.555 And if history means anything,
it is equally clear that Flook and Mayo founded the inventive
application test on a profoundly mistaken interpretation of Neilson and
the other hot-blast cases.
It was also history that led the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank to uniformly
deny that Mayo’s inventive concept entails an inventive application.556 The
court’s rejection of inventive application follows necessarily from the
court’s underlying conception of the foundation of patent law. The
Federal Circuit’s paradigm of patent law remains largely defined by the
late Judge Giles Rich: The invention is the physical matter or steps
defined by the claims and nothing more or less.557 The requirements of
patentability are only those set out by the 1952 Patent Act, and those
requirements must be lodged doctrinally and intellectually in a single
section of the 1952 Patent Act, not between or across them.558 In such a
patent law paradigm, to the extent one concedes any extra-statutory
limits on patent-eligible subject matter, it is an ill-formed question to
ask whether a claim embodies an inventive application of an abstract
idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon. As Judge Rader argued in
CLS Bank, in that paradigm of patent law, inventiveness is the sole
concern, if any, of § 103; it cannot be relevant to whether something is
an “invention” within the categories defined by § 101.559
But that paradigm is not necessarily the patent law of the Supreme
Court. Notwithstanding the passage of the 1952 Patent Act, today’s
Court continues to reach back to an older paradigm of patent law, one
with a different conception of “the invention” and perhaps one with
more fluidity between the various doctrines of patentability and
infringement.560 For attention to the mental process of invention did not
555. Excepting mental processes, and perhaps natural products. See supra Part IV.
556. See supra notes 526–32 and accompanying text.
557. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843,
861–64 (2010).
558. See id. at 857, 858.
559. CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1294, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
560. Today’s Federal Circuit demands a strict separation between doctrines of infringement
and validity, and analysis tends to be compartmentalized in one doctrine or the other. For
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die with Justice Douglas’s “flash of genius.” Justice Stevens explained
that “‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the
inventor’s conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that
idea.” 561 And Justice Thomas declared that patents have an inventive
essence—an essence that may subsist in objects outside the boundaries
defined by the claims.562 In this paradigm of patent law, an “invention”
is not the set of objects or acts defined by the claims; an “invention” is a
product of human ingenuity.563 It is permissible under this conception,
though not required, to conclude that an obvious application of a newly
discovered fundamental principle is not an invention. Discoveries, at
least, are not the product of humans and obvious applications are not the
product of ingenuity.
That definition was the foundation of Flook. For Justice Stevens,
fundamental principles were unpatentable because they were things that
had “always existed,”564 not creations of the human mind. “Postsolution
activity,” whether insignificant or not, might be part of the inventor’s
claim, but it could not confer patent eligibility on an invention if it did
not form part of the inventive concept.565 As a limiting principle, Justice
Thomas rejected that notion in Alice, asserting that the category of
unpatentable “abstract ideas” encompasses human creations (such as
business methods) as well as “preexisting, fundamental truths.”566 But
in Myriad, while the case ultimately seemed to turn on whether isolated
DNA was “new” within the meaning of § 101, Justice Thomas viewed
the central dispute in the case as whether the process of separating a
gene from the rest of the chromosome was “an inventive act.” 567 He
example, it is usually necessary in modern patent litigation for a litigant to prevail separately on
both infringement and validity. See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent
Infringement Cases?, AIPLA Q.J., Winter 2006, at 1, 8. But adjudication in the nineteenth
century, and the early twentieth as well, might have resolved a case by concluding that a litigant
could not simultaneously prevail on infringement and validity, without actually deciding which
doctrine resolved the case. See Lefstin, supra note 557, at 876.
561. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998).
562. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, at 632–35 (2008)
(holding that sale of products embodying inventive aspects of patents triggers exhaustion of
patents, even though products did not fall within claims).
563. Robinson, for example, founded his system on the principle that the invention was the
result of an inventive act, yet he viewed the discovery of new properties of matter as integral to
the inventive act. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 96, at 142–43 (1890).
564. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 & n.15 (1978).
565. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 215 & n.39, 216 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
566. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356–57 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (rejecting the argument that abstract ideas are limited to truths that
always existed).
567. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114,
2116 (2013) (emphasis added).
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concluded that separating a gene from its natural context was not, in the
end, “an act of invention.”568
And yet, despite Mayo’s resuscitation of Funk Brothers and Flook,
there are signs that the Court may be retreating from the use of
inventive application as a test for patent eligibility. In Alice, Justice
Thomas held that Mayo’s inventive concept is the sine qua non for
patent eligibility,569 despite the complete absence of that doctrine from
Myriad. Alice, however, emphasizes the genericness of the patentee’s
application, rather than its lack of inventiveness;570 the word obvious is
conspicuously lacking from the opinion.571
But that distinction between specific application and generic
application perhaps occurs in Mayo as well. For Justice Breyer tells us
that one cannot transform a law of nature into a patent-eligible
application by simply disclosing the law of nature, and adding the
words “apply it;”572 nor could Einstein or Archimedes have patented their
famous discoveries by merely appending an instruction to apply them.573
With that statement Baron Parke would have concurred: Neilson could not
have secured a patent if he had disclosed that hot air is better than cold, and
then stated “apply it” without disclosing a mode of practical application. And
perhaps that was the distinction Justice Felix Frankfurter would have drawn
in Funk Brothers. His concurrence argued that Bond’s claims were
unpatentable, not because they monopolized a law of nature, but because
they were drawn to the idea of compatible strains, rather than the mode of
application Bond invented.574 Surveying the tortuous path of the law since
Justice Douglas set forth the test of inventive application in Funk
Brothers, one must ask if the goals of patent law would be better served
by returning to that historical distinction between principles in the
abstract—whether they be laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
568. Id. at 2117 (emphasis added).
569. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (explaining that inventive concept is necessary to
transform a claim into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea).
570. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A Post-Alice Jurisprudence of
Abstractions, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2015).
571. Nor does Alice contradict Judge Lourie’s or Judge Rader’s rejection of inventiveness
as an aspect of inventive concept. But one can draw little from this omission, since Alice refrains
altogether from addressing the Federal Circuit’s opinions.
572. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
573. See id. at 1297.
574. According to Frankfurter, while Bond was entitled to claim the mixtures of bacteria he
had shown experimentally to be compatible, his claims were drawn to all mixtures of bacteria
having the property of compatibility. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
133 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For Frankfurter, a claim based on “the idea that there
might be mutually compatible strains” could not be sustained. Id. at 133–34. He regarded this as
the equivalent to the discoverer of a particular alloy with desirable properties patenting “the idea
of alloying metals for this purpose.” Id. at 134.
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creations of the human mind—and their embodiment in practical
applications to the useful arts.

